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CONCEPTUAL DIFFICULTIES IN THE 
EMPIRICAL STUDY OF BILATERAL 
INVESTMENT TREATIES 
Jason Webb Yackee* 
INTRODUCTION 
ilateral investment treaties, or BITs, have emerged as one of the 
most remarkable recent developments in international law. In 
BITs, two countries—often a developed country and a less-developed 
country—extend legally binding promises to treat each other’s foreign 
investors favorably. The first BIT, according to most observers, was 
signed in 1959, and since that time BITs have multiplied at an extraordi-
nary pace.1 The United Nations Conference on Trade and Development 
(“UNCTAD”) calculates that there were fewer than two hundred BITs in 
the 1980s; by 1998, there were at least 1700.2 Many of these BITs con-
tain dispute settlement provisions that allow investors to initiate binding 
international arbitration against the state hosting their investment. In 
BIT-based arbitrations, arbitrators are empowered to make authoritative 
statements on the content and application of important, contested, and 
politically sensitive international legal principles, such as the amount of 
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 1. I show below that, as a conceptual and factual matter, this claim regarding the 
“first” BIT is problematic. But it is sufficiently accurate to allow that year to serve as a 
very rough guide to the start of the BIT era. See also infra Figure 3, note 84, and accom-
panying text. 
 2. UNITED NATIONS CONFERENCE ON TRADE AND DEVELOPMENT [UNCTAD], 
TRENDS IN INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT AGREEMENTS: AN OVERVIEW 22 fig.2, U.N. Doc. 
No. UNCTAD/ITE/IIT/13 (1999) [hereinafter UNCTAD TRENDS IN INTERNATIONAL 
INVESTMENT AGREEMENTS]; UNCTAD, BILATERAL INVESTMENT TREATIES IN THE MID-
1990S (1998) [hereinafter UNCTAD BITS IN THE MID-1990S] (“The total number of trea-
ties signed by the end of 1980s jumped to 386 from a total of 167 at the end of the 
1970s.”). In addition to these comprehensive reports, UNCTAD has published other im-
portant accounts of the growth of the BIT phenomenon. See, e.g., UNITED NATIONS 
CENTRE ON TRANSNATIONAL CORPORATIONS [UNCTC], BILATERAL INVESTMENT 
TREATIES (1988) [hereinafter UNCTC BILATERAL INVESTMENT TREATIES]; UNITED 
NATIONS CONFERENCE ON TRADE AND DEVELOPMENT, BILATERAL INVESTMENT TREATIES 
1959–1999, U.N. Doc. No. UNCTAD/ITE/IIA/2 (2000) [hereinafter UNCTAD BITs 
1959–1999]. 
B 
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compensation due under international law for government actions that 
amount to an expropriation of the foreign investor’s property.3 
As a result of the proliferation of BITs, there has been a proliferation 
of international arbitration claims in which investors seek to recover 
money damages from the states hosting their investments for alleged vio-
lations of international law. For example, arbitral tribunals organized 
under the World Bank’s International Centre for the Settlement of In-
vestment Disputes (“ICSID”), the frequent forum of choice in BIT-based 
arbitration clauses, decided just twenty-six international investment dis-
putes as of 1990; by 2007 ICSID tribunals had decided over 130 such 
cases, with over 120 additional cases still pending.4 Argentina alone 
faced international legal claims of approximately $16 billion in 2004, 
roughly one percent of its gross domestic product (“GDP”) at the time.5 
These developments have led to critiques of the BIT system6 and in-
creased interest from empirically minded social scientists who have stud-
ied the causes and effects of the treaties. For example, Elkins, Guzman, 
and Simmons have presented a sophisticated statistical model to support 
their argument that developing countries enter into BITs as part of a ra-
tional “competition for capital.”7 Others have examined whether states 
                                                                                                             
 3. See Vicki Been & Joel C. Beauvais, The Global Fifth Amendment? NAFTA’s 
Investment Protection and the Misguided Quest for an International “Regulatory Tak-
ings” Doctrine, 78 N.Y.U. L. REV. 30, 55 (2003). 
 4. ICSID was established by multilateral treaty in the 1960s as a specialized forum 
to decide disputes between host states and investors. Convention on the Settlement of 
Investment Disputes between States and Nationals of Other States, opened for signature 
Mar. 18, 1965, 17 U.S.T. 1270, 575 U.N.T.S. 159 [hereinafter ICSID Convention]. In-
formation on the ICSID docket is available at http://icsid.worldbank.org/ICSID/Index.jsp. 
 5. Figures for legal claims pending against Argentina are those as of August 2004. 
R. Doak Bishop & Roberto Aguirre Luzi, Investment Claims—First Lessons from Argen-
tina, in INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW AND ARBITRATION: LEADING CASES FROM THE 
ICSID, NAFTA, BILATERAL TREATIES, AND CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL LAW 425, 425 
(Todd Weiler ed., 2005). For data on gross domestic product, see United Nations Statis-
tics Division, http://unstats.un.org/unsd/cdb/cdb_country_prof_select.asp (select country 
“Argentina” and profile “Economic growth, investment”) (last visited Apr. 9, 2008). 
 6. For example, Van Harten argues that BITs set up a legal system that benefits 
business interests. GUS VAN HARTEN, INVESTMENT TREATY ARBITRATION AND PUBLIC 
LAW (2007). Sornarajah provides a brief overview of the most important critiques. M. 
SORNARAJAH, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW ON FOREIGN INVESTMENT 259–268 (2d ed. 2004). 
 7. Zachary Elkins, Andrew T. Guzman & Beth A. Simmons, Competing for Capital: 
The Diffusion of Bilateral Investment Treaties, 1960–2000, 60 INT’L ORG. 811 (2006). See 
also Deborah L. Swenson, Why Do Developing Countries Sign BITs?, 12 U.C. DAVIS J. 
INT’L L. & POL’Y 131, 147 (2005) (“In some cases, if BIT signing is expected, it is likely 
that investors may invest in the host country before the BIT signing takes place, since the 
investors confidently anticipate that their [pre-BIT] investments will soon receive further 
protections when the signing occurs.”). 
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that enter into BITs tend to attract greater amounts of foreign invest-
ment.8 For example, Neumayer and Spess have suggested that develop-
ing states benefit from massive increases in foreign direct investment 
(“FDI”) flows when they sign BITs with major capital-exporting states.9 
Their findings are a powerful indication that international law matters to 
investors, who, if the statistics are to be believed, give the presence or 
absence of BITs great weight when making investment decisions.10 
The purpose of this Article is to identify and draw attention to the con-
ceptual difficulties implicit in empirical studies of BITs that have not yet 
been adequately addressed. The goal here is modest but important. Qua-
si-experimental statistical studies of investment treaties, such as the stud-
ies by Elkins, Guzman, and Simmons and Neumayer and Spess cited 
above, seek to confirm or disconfirm theoretical expectations through the 
identification of empirical correlations between key variables. As the old 
saw goes, correlation does not equal causation, and whether the former 
really does confirm the latter depends in part on the internal validity of 
the particular study and its measurements of the underlying theoretical 
concepts. A statistical study may be described as internally valid if the 
researcher has isolated the true cause of any observed correlation.11 Put 
somewhat differently, internal validity requires that a study’s measure-
ment techniques correctly identify the phenomena of theoretical interest 
and control for plausible alternative explanations.12 
The central claim developed below is that empirical BIT analysts have 
so far done a relatively poor job of ensuring the internal validity of their 
studies—that is, whether the ways they measure the BIT phenomenon 
are sufficiently accurate and complete to capture the underlying theoreti-
                                                                                                             
 8. See, e.g., Eric Neumayer & Laura Spess, Do Bilateral Investment Treaties In-
crease Foreign Direct Investment to Developing Countries?, 33 WORLD DEV. 1567 
(2005). 
 9. Id. at 1582. 
 10. See id. However, several other studies do not support Neumayer and Spess’s con-
clusion that there is strong positive link between BITs and foreign investment flows. See 
Jeswald W. Salacuse & Nicholas P. Sullivan, Do BITs Really Work? An Evaluation of 
Bilateral Investment Treaties and Their Grand Bargain, 46 HARVARD INT’L L.J. 67 
(2005); Marie Hallward-Driemer, Do Bilateral Investment Treaties Affect FDI? Only a 
Bit . . . and They Could Bite 1–2 (World Bank, Policy Research Working Paper Series 
No. 3121, 2003). 
 11. See EDWARD G. CARMINES & RICHARD A. ZELLER, RELIABILITY AND VALIDITY 
ASSESSMENT 12 (1979) (“In a very general sense, any measuring device is valid if it does 
what it is intended to do. An indicator of some abstract concept is valid to the extent that 
it measures what it purports to measure.”). 
 12. See generally CARMINES & ZELLER, supra note 11; WILLIAM M.K. TROCHIM, 
RESEARCH METHODS KNOWLEDGE BASE 171–190 (2d ed. 2001). 
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cal concept of interest. Analysts are not generally interested in the trea-
ties simply as treaties, but as indicators of the degree to which states de-
siring foreign investment (“host states”) have used formal legal means—
particularly international law and international legal institutions—to 
“credibly commit” to treat investors favorably.13 Postulating that BITs 
are credible commitment devices relies on the premise that the treaties 
are especially (and perhaps uniquely) effective at resolving what is said 
to be the central problématique of foreign investment: an investment, 
once made, cannot easily be undone, and the investor who relies on the 
host state’s initial promises of favorable treatment risks being rudely sur-
prised when the host state later demands to renegotiate the terms of the 
original deal. This problem, sometimes described as one of “obsolescing 
bargain,”14 is not simply a problem for foreign investors; it is also a prob-
                                                                                                             
 13. See generally Andrew T. Guzman, Why LDCs Sign Treaties that Hurt Them: 
Explaining the Popularity of Bilateral Investment Treaties, 38 VA. J. INT’L L. 639 (1998). 
Guzman’s view of BITs as a commitment device is reflected in most subsequent empiri-
cal studies of the treaties, including Neumayer & Spess, supra note 8, and Elkins et al., 
supra note 7. It is also reflected in doctrinal studies of the evolution of BITs. See, e.g., 
Thomas W. Wälde, The “Umbrella” Clause in Investment Arbitration: A Comment on 
Original Intentions and Recent Cases, 6 J. WORLD INVEST. & TRADE 183, 185–86 (2005) 
(discussing BITs as part of a “culture of commitment”). Williamson’s influential work on 
transaction cost economics provides the obvious inspiration for credible commitment 
theories of BITs. See, e.g., OLIVER E. WILLIAMSON, THE MECHANISMS OF GOVERNANCE 
377 (1996). Williamson defines a “credible commitment” as:  
. . . a contract in which a promisee is reliably compensated should the promisor 
prematurely terminate or otherwise alter the agreement. This should be con-
trasted with noncredible commitments, which are empty promises, and semi-
credible commitments, in which there is a residual hazard. Credible commit-
ments are pertinent to contracts in which one or both parties invest in specific 
assets.  
Id. Williamson’s ideas also permeate the “political risk” literature and the much broader 
literature on the institutional origins of economic growth. See, e.g., WITOLD JERZY 
HENISZ, POLITICS AND INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT: MEASURING RISKS AND PROTECTING 
PROFITS (2002); DOUGLASS C. NORTH, INSTITUTIONS, INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE AND 
ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE 50 (James Alt & Douglass North eds., 1990). 
 14. See RAYMOND VERNON, SOVEREIGNTY AT BAY: THE MULTINATIONAL SPREAD OF 
U.S. ENTERPRISES 46–59 (1971); see also Jean Boddewyn, Early U.S. Business-School 
Literature (1960–1975) on International Business-Government Relations: Its Twenty-
First-Century Relevance, in INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS AND GOVERNMENT RELATIONS IN 
THE 21ST CENTURY 25, 36 (Robert Grosse ed., 2005). Obsolescing bargain theories of 
foreign investor-host state relations have been subject to some recent and important criti-
cism. See INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS AND GOVERNMENT RELATIONS IN THE 21ST CENTURY 
315, pt. III (Robert Grosse ed., 2005). In my view, obsolescing bargain theory is most 
vulnerable to attack on the grounds that it exaggerates the extent to which long-term con-
tractual stability is either desirable or achievable and ignores the powerful role that repu-
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lem for host states that desire foreign investment. The host state that is 
unable to convince investors that it will not unduly interfere with the in-
vestment’s profitability post-establishment will be denied investment or 
will have to pay a risk premium for it. BITs resolve problems of credible 
commitment by providing host states with a mechanism to make favor-
able substantive promises to investors (under the banner of international 
law) and by linking them to certain procedural guarantees—in particular, 
access to international arbitration—that allow the investor to enforce 
those promises. The prospect of litigation encourages host states to honor 
their promises to investors despite obsolescing bargain dynamics. Inves-
tors recognize that investments covered by BITs are relatively immune to 
such dynamics and will accordingly be more willing to invest.15 
To test credible commitment theories of BITs, analysts generally at-
tempt to quantify the extent to which host states have credibly committed 
to treat investors favorably with empirical data, such as the number of 
signed BITS and the amount of FDI. For example, Neumayer and 
Spess’s study counts the number of BITs that each developing country 
has signed and looks for statistical correlations between the number of 
BITs and foreign investment flows.16 Elkins, Guzman, and Simmons’s 
study likewise counts the number of BITs entered into by competitor 
countries and looks for correlations between the number of competitor 
BITs and the probability that a particular state will sign its own BIT.17 
To construct their counts of BITs, these analysts rely largely, if not 
solely, on lists of treaties compiled by UNCTAD. UNCTAD has long 
researched and promoted BITs, and in various publications it has pre-
sented comprehensive chronological listings of BITs signed to date.18 
UNCTAD’s longstanding work documenting and analyzing the BIT phe-
nomenon is significant, and its list of BITs may be adequate for certain 
research questions. But, as I explain in detail below, the list is problem-
atic for the research questions posed by most empirical BIT analysts. 
My basic argument is that the persuasiveness—or the internal valid-
ity—of empirical studies of the causes and effects of BITs necessarily 
depends on whether analysts have accurately and comprehensively iden-
                                                                                                             
tation plays in discouraging host states from treating foreign investors poorly. The latter 
problem stems in particular from the tendency to focus on the individual transaction or 
investment relationship, divorced from the larger context of the host country’s ongoing 
and future relationships with other investors. 
 15. See VERNON, supra note 14, at 46–53; Elkins et al., supra note 7, at 812–14, 823–
24; Neumayer & Spess, supra note 8, at 1570–71. 
 16. Neumayer & Spess, supra note 8, at 1573. 
 17. Elkins et al., supra note 7, at 827–28. 
 18. See supra note 2 and authorities cited therein. 
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tified the relevant instances of credible commitment. When analysts rely 
solely on UNCTAD’s count of BITs, their studies fail to identify all 
sources of credible commitment that are theoretically likely to provide 
the host state with a competitive advantage attracting foreign capital. 
This is illustrated by two interrelated inquiries. 
First, are the treaties that UNCTAD identifies sufficiently similar in 
their theoretical capacity to perform as credible commitment devices? 
Here, the inquiry is largely whether UNCTAD has gotten the treaty count 
correct and for a variety of reasons the answer is no. 
Second, has UNCTAD identified all of the theoretically relevant legal 
devices by which states have sought to credibly commit to extend com-
parably favorable treatment to investors? My claim here is that analysts 
relying on UNCTAD’s list of BITs have largely failed to recognize that 
BITs are not the only formal legal means by which host states might 
credibly commit to investor friendly policies. There are close equivalents 
to BITs—primarily municipal law and investment contracts—that have 
strong theoretical potential to act as reasonably comparable substitutes 
for investment treaties. 
In short, UNCTAD’s count of BITs provides a surprisingly misleading 
picture of the scope of the phenomenon of law-based credible commit-
ment, both generally and as to particular states. This critique is not aimed 
at UNCTAD, however; it addresses scholarship that uses UNCTAD’s 
treaty data uncritically by ignoring the treaties’ content or other sources 
of credible commitment. 
As I will demonstrate below, we should approach the statistical validity 
of existing empirical analyses of BITs with a substantial grain of salt, 
though this Article’s main point is not really a statistical one. It makes no 
attempt to re-run existing statistical analyses, nor does it claim that key 
correlations would fall out of or into statistical significance if these ana-
lyses were re-run. The main point is more fundamental: BIT analysts 
need to convincingly link their abstract concepts to empirical indicators 
of those concepts.19 Until they do, credible commitment stories of the 
causes and consequences of BITs will remain far less persuasive than 
they might be otherwise. 
Section I of this Article provides a brief historical overview of FDI and 
BITs in order to illustrate macro level trends over time. Section II places 
BITs firmly in the credible commitment framework, arguing that BITs 
that lack strong dispute settlement mechanisms have little theoretical po-
tential to credibly commit developing countries to anything. Section III 
presents an empirical examination of the dispute settlement provisions of 
                                                                                                             
 19. See CARMINES & ZELLER, supra note 11, at 10. 
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nearly one thousand BITs. Section IV discusses the importance of alter-
native policy instruments that may serve as substitutes for BITs and ar-
gues that the use of such instruments must be considered when determin-
ing the extent to which a host state has legalized its relations with foreign 
investors. Section V concludes. 
I. FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT AND BITS: AN OVERVIEW 
Developing countries have historically viewed foreign investment with 
deep ambivalence. As then U.S. Assistant Secretary of State William L. 
Thorp observed in 1948: 
As engineers and technicians we are more than welcome; our skills are 
eagerly sought; but as businessmen, as entrepreneurs, we are often not 
so welcome. Sometimes we feel that at the same moment that our capi-
tal is sought, every obstacle is being put in the way of its use on a fair 
and equitable basis.20 
Mr. Thorp attributed this attitude to the perception of the foreign inves-
tor as an “exploiter and not a contributor”21—the foreign investor’s “in-
terest is not in the local welfare, . . . his allegiance is to a distant stock-
holder, and . . . when he has won the highest return possible he and his 
enterprise will withdraw.”22 Developing countries’ policies toward for-
eign investors reflect this ambivalence. They seek to encourage the right 
kinds of foreign investment while also attempting to maintain the ability 
to control and subjugate that investment to national development or regu-
latory priorities.23 
The level of ambivalence ebbs and flows with time. In some eras, 
when ambivalence shades into hostility, developing countries may em-
phasize subjugation over encouragement. In other eras, when ambiva-
lence shades into affection, systems of control may be dismantled in or-
der to attract more investment through an improved investment climate. 
In this current era of seemingly relentless FDI promotion, FDI competi-
tion, and, perhaps not coincidentally, increasingly massive foreign capi-
tal flows, the idea of host state ambivalence toward foreign investment 
                                                                                                             
 20. L.H. Woolsey, The Problem of Foreign Investment, 42 AMER. J. INT’L L. 121, 121 
(1948) (quoting Mr. Thorp’s commentary on foreign investment). 
 21. Id. 
 22. Id. (paraphrasing Mr. Thorp’s commentary on foreign investment). 
 23. This ambivalence is well illustrated in Moran’s influential study of the Chilean 
experience with foreign investors in the copper industry. See THEODORE MORAN, 
MULTINATIONAL CORPORATIONS AND THE POLITICS OF DEPENDENCE: COPPER IN CHILE 5–6 
(1974). 
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must seem rather strange.24 But not so long ago ambivalence, if not out-
right hostility, was the norm rather than the exception. After World War 
II, and especially by the 1960s and early 1970s, analysts and policymak-
ers in the Third World and their sympathizers in the First pushed Argen-
tine economist Raul Prebisch’s ideas about the plight of the economic 
periphery into a reasonably coherent set of propositions about the de-
pendency of the Third World on the First.25 One of the chief villains in 
the dependencia theory was the multinational corporation, whose in-
vestments, if left unchecked, would perpetuate a world system in which 
the Third World would remain exploited and immiserated.26 The overall 
mood was such that, by 1974, C. Fred Bergsten could plausibly claim: 
Virtually every country in the world . . . is levying increasingly strin-
gent requirements on foreign firms . . . . Few countries ask any longer 
the simplistic question: “Do we want foreign investment?” The issue is 
how to get foreign investment on the terms which are best for them, 
and indeed how to use the power of the firms to promote their own na-
tional goals.27 
Bergsten went on to warn that then current ideas about the proper role 
of foreign investors in national development strategies would lead to in-
vestment wars in which host states would increasingly regulate and limit 
the activities of multinational corporations.28 
Like most grandiose predictions, Bergsten’s was quite wrong. What is 
so surprising is how quickly it was wrong. By the early 1980s, develop-
ing and developed countries alike were having serious second thoughts 
                                                                                                             
 24. On the growth of FDI promotional efforts by developing countries, see Jacques 
Morisset, Does a Country Need a Promotion Agency to Attract Foreign Direct Invest-
ment? A Small Analytical Model Applied to 58 Countries (World Bank, Policy Research 
Working Paper Series No. 3038, 2003); Louis T. Wells & Alvin G. Wint, Foreign. Inv. 
Adv. Serv., Marketing a Country: Promotion as a Tool for Attracting Foreign Investment 
(Occasional Paper No. 20357) (2000). On the growth of FDI flows, see infra Figure 1. 
 25. See Jason Webb Yackee, Are BITs Such a Bright Idea? Exploring the Ideational 
Basis of Investment Treaty Enthusiasm, 12 U.C. DAVIS J. INT’L L. & POL’Y 195, 203–06 
(2005). Dependency theory was not so much a coherent theory as it was a collection of 
“more or less articulate notion[s]” centered around the belief that the international divi-
sion of labor between the rich “core” countries and the poorer “periphery” was the pri-
mary reason for third-world underdevelopment. MAGNUS BLOSTRÖM & BJÖRNE HETTNE, 
DEVELOPMENT THEORY IN TRANSITION: THE DEPENDENCY DEBATE AND BEYOND: THIRD 
WORLD RESPONSES 2 (1984). Dependency theorists argued that the “periphery” should 
pursue a development strategy based on economic self-reliance rather than on deep link-
ages with the “core.” Id. at 76. 
 26. MORAN, supra note 23, at 3–15. 
 27. C. Fred Bergsten, Coming Investment Wars?, 53 FOREIGN AFF. 135, 136 (1974). 
 28. Id. at 151–52. 
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about the wisdom of restricting and controlling foreign investment. In a 
1985 article, Encarnation and Wells documented the rise of competition 
for foreign investment among developing countries, in which there was a 
growing trend towards investment incentives and away from investment 
controls.29 Indeed, over the following years many developing countries 
began dismantling the elaborate national controls of foreign investment 
that had been painstakingly erected just a few years before; either caus-
ally or coincidentally, the volume of worldwide FDI flows has increased 
by tremendous leaps and bounds.30 Figure 1 illustrates the trend.31 In real 
terms as of the year 2000, the worldwide annual volume of FDI inflows 
increased from its 1970 level by a factor of nearly forty-eight. It is also 
striking that the bulk of the increased investment has gone to the most 
developed countries. 
Figure 1. Annual FDI Inflows, World vs. Least Developed Countries 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                             
 29. Dennis J. Encarnation & Louis T. Wells, Jr., Sovereignty en Garde: Negotiating 
with Foreign Investors, 39 INT’L ORG. 47 (1985). 
 30. See, e.g., Eduardo A. Wiesner, ANCOM: A New Attitude Toward Foreign Invest-
ment?, 24 U. MIAMI INTER-AM. L. REV. 435, 435–65 (1993) (documenting a loosening of 
the Andean Community’s foreign investment regime).  
 31.  Data for Figure 1 derives from the World Bank World Development Indicators, 
available at http://www.worldbank.org/ (select “Index” and “Data and Statistics,” then 
“Data” from the left-hand menu). 
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From a formal legal perspective, the most noticeable (and notable) as-
pect of the widespread change of heart regarding the value of FDI has 
been the diffusion of BITs as an important means of attracting foreign 
capital. Figure 2 below compares the cumulative number of BITs signed 
from 1970 to 2001 to the number of new BITs signed annually.32 
 
Figure 2. Cumulative and Annual Count of BITs Signed between Major 
Capital-Exporting and Capital-Importing Countries  
1970–2001 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                             
 32. Data for Figure 2 is compiled from UNCTC BILATERAL INVESTMENT TREATIES, 
supra note 2; UNCTAD BITS IN THE MID-1990S, supra note 2; and UNCTAD BITs 
1959–1999, supra note 2. I discuss the mechanics of counting BITs in much more detail 
in the following Sections of this Article. Figure 2 includes BITs signed between the top 
eighteen capital-exporting states and the remaining capital-importing or less-developed 
countries (“LDCs”). The top eighteen capital-exporting states are Australia, Austria, Bel-
gium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, Nor-
way, Singapore, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, the United Kingdom, and the United States. 
Historically these states have supplied between eighty-four and ninety-nine percent of 
annual world FDI flows over the past thirty-some years. The preceding figures were gen-
erated from FDI data compiled by UNCTAD’s Division on Investment, Technology, and 
Enterprise Development. See UNCTAD, Foreign Direct Investment Database, 
http://www.unctad.org/Templates/Page.asp?intItemID=1923&lang=1 (last visited Mar. 
11, 2008). 
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The coinciding trends illustrated in Figures 1 and 2 suggest that current 
interest in BITs is well justified. The rise to prominence of BITs de-
mands explanation, as does the concurrent increase in FDI flows. Indeed, 
the casual empiricist could be forgiven for asserting (or assuming) a 
causal link between the two trends. While scientific query into questions 
of cause and effect, origins, and consequences should not be abandoned, 
it is nevertheless important to question how much we already know and 
suggest additional points and problems to consider as empirical research 
on BITs progresses. As I show in Sections II and III, future empirical 
research that accounts for important procedural differences in the BITs is 
a necessary first step in any empirical examination of them or their ef-
fects on investor behavior. 
II. BITS, CREDIBLE COMMITMENT, AND THE IMPORTANCE OF 
PROCEDURE 
BITs are best understood as dual-function devices. On the one hand, 
they provide states with a means of making what might be called “sub-
stantive” promises to treat investors well. On the other hand, they pro-
vide states with a means of making those substantive promises more 
credible. Consequently, a threshold conceptual question for any empiri-
cal BIT analyst should be whether the treaties identified by UNCTAD 
are sufficiently similar in terms of both the favorableness of the substan-
tive promises extended to investors and the credibility of those promises. 
The potential value of a given treaty to an investor will naturally depend 
on the values given to these two logically separate parameters. A treaty 
that advances wholly credible but relatively stingy substantive promises 
is not necessarily more valuable to the investor than less credible prom-
ises of significantly more favorable treatment. 
Analysts commonly assume that BITs’ substantive promises are indeed 
both equivalently favorable and identically credible. The first assumption 
is, with one major exception, not an entirely unreasonable one. The sec-
ond assumption can be highly problematic. 
Most BITs mimic, at least in broad strokes, the 1959 Draft Interna-
tional Convention on Investments Abroad (commonly known as the Abs-
Shawcross Convention)33 and the Organisation for Economic Coopera-
tion and Development (“OECD”) 1967 Draft Convention on the Protec-
                                                                                                             
 33. For the text of the Abs-Shawcross Convention, see The Proposed Convention to 
Protect Private Foreign Investment: A Round Table, 9 J. PUB. L. 115, 116 (1960). 
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tion of Foreign Property.34 Because of their common origins, the lan-
guage used and the subjects covered in different BITs appear remarkably 
similar, both over time and across countries. For example, capital-
exporting states have long been preoccupied with convincing host states 
to provide certain generally applicable standards of treatment for estab-
lished investments.35 BITs accordingly, and largely to a tee, promise that 
investors shall be treated in any number of imperfectly distinguishable 
ways. The most common examples include promises of “non-
discriminatory” treatment, treatment that is not “unreasonable” or “arbi-
trary,” “fair and equitable” treatment, treatment including “full protection 
and security,” treatment as favorable as that provided to domestic inves-
tors (“national treatment”), and “most-favored-nation” (“MFN”) treat-
ment.36 Investors have also long been concerned with maintaining their 
ability to repatriate investment proceeds out of the host country and with 
receiving compensation in the event that their property is expropriated. 
Most BITs unsurprisingly contain somewhat more specific guarantees as 
to both subjects.37 
This set of promises forms what may be called the substantive core of 
modern BITs. Recognizing this substantive core makes it possible to ana-
lyze the treaties as a conceptually cohesive group. That task is further 
facilitated by the widespread promise of MFN treatment. A promise of 
MFN treatment means that when a host state offers more favorable sub-
stantive promises to investors in a later BIT, those more favorable prom-
ises will automatically apply to investors covered by the first, less favor-
able BIT.38 The ubiquity of the MFN clause also makes it a largely use-
less and virtually impossible task for the analyst to construct any sort of 
index of the relative substantive favorableness of the various treaties, just 
as it makes it rather difficult for an investor to determine just what ex-
actly has been promised.39 
                                                                                                             
 34. Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development [OECD], Draft Con-
vention on the Protection of Foreign Property, Oct. 12, 1967, O.E.C.D. No. 23081, re-
printed in 7 I.L.M. 117 (1968) [hereinafter OECD Draft Convention]. 
 35. See UNCTC BILATERAL INVESTMENT TREATIES, supra note 2, at 40. 
 36. These common BIT provisions are discussed in RUDOLF DOLZER & MARGRETE 
STEVENS, BILATERAL INVESTMENT TREATIES 49 (1995). 
 37. Id. at 97–118. 
 38. OECD Draft Convention, supra note 34, at 1. 
 39. The difficulty is compounded by the fact that “MFN clauses do not have a univer-
sal meaning. Indeed, the formulation and application of MFN clauses varies widely 
among investment treaties. . . . The proper application and interpretation of a particular 
MFN clause in a particular case requires careful examination of the text of that provision 
. . . .” OECD, Most-Favoured-Nation Treatment in International Investment Law 16 
(OECD, Working Paper On International Investment No. 2004/2, 2004). 
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U.S. BITs provide the principal exception to the general rule of sub-
stantive sameness. The point is tangential to the larger argument, but it is 
worth emphasizing that U.S. BITs, unlike the BITs of other capital-
exporting countries, consistently extend promises of favorable treatment 
to investors at the pre-establishment (i.e., pre-investment) stage of the 
investment process.40 Generally, this means that host states entering into 
BITs with the United States promise to allow American investors to enter 
the country and make an investment under the same procedures and on 
the same terms as domestic investors or as the investors of other states—
a significant relinquishment of a host state’s well-recognized (and for 
much of history, jealously guarded) sovereign right to exert largely abso-
lute control over the entry of foreigners.41 And because promises of MFN 
treatment usually apply only to post-establishment phases of the invest-
ment process, this particularly liberal aspect of U.S. BITs is not incorpo-
rated by reference into the treaties of other capital-exporting countries. 
Analysts, especially those interested in the effects of BITs on FDI flows, 
should adjust the conceptual weight of the value of signing or ratifying a 
U.S. BIT as compared to signing or ratifying a BIT with another state. 
Signing a U.S. BIT represents a substantively different commitment than 
signing a BIT with other capital-exporting states. 
The larger point, however, is that BIT promises, even if we assume 
them to be equally favorable, are not equally credible. To see why, note 
that if BITs have the capacity to function as credible commitment de-
vices, it implies that something about the treaties makes them particu-
larly unattractive—e.g., costly—for states to renege on favorable prom-
ises to investors. It has long been argued that in some instances treaty-
based promises may be self-enforcing in the sense that a breach of the 
treaty will lead automatically, or nearly so, to the imposition of signifi-
                                                                                                             
 40. For example, Article II(1) of the BIT between the United States and Uzbekistan 
establishes that “[w]ith respect to the establishment [or] acquisition . . . of covered in-
vestments, each Party shall accord treatment no less favorable than that it accords, in like 
situations, to investments in its territory of its own nationals or companies [national 
treatment] or to investments . . . of a third country [most-favored nation treatment].” 
Treaty Concerning the Encouragement and Reciprocal Protection of Investment, U.S.-
Uzb., Dec. 16, 1994, S. TREATY DOC. NO. 104-25 (1996). But most non-U.S. BITs “guar-
antee no right of access for capital or persons to the host state, they leave the home state 
with unlimited discretion to prohibit or regulate outward investment flows, [and] the 
obligation of the host state not to discriminate applies only after investment is estab-
lished.” Kenneth J. Vandevelde, The Political Economy of a Bilateral Investment Treaty, 
92 AM. J. INT’L L. 621, 630 (1998). 
 41. SORNARAJAH, supra note 6, at 97 (“The right of a state to control the entry of for-
eign investment is unlimited, as it is a right that flows from sovereignty.”). 
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cant costs on the breaching state.42 In most cases those costs will be repu-
tational—third parties will observe the breach and update their beliefs 
about the breaching state’s willingness to honor its commitments.43 In the 
case of foreign investment, the host state that breaches an investment 
treaty can expect perceptions of its investment climate to worsen, making 
it more difficult for the state to attract desired investment in the future. 
The prudent host state will thus weigh the short-term benefits of breach-
ing the treaty (say, for example, the domestic political benefits of seizing 
a foreign-owned mining operation) against the long-term costs of for-
gone future foreign capital. 
It is very difficult to argue, however, that the substantive promises con-
tained in BITs are meaningfully self-enforcing. The difficulty arises from 
the fact that these core substantive promises are relatively vague stan-
dards. What the promises of favorable treatment actually mean or how 
they will apply in a given instance can be highly uncertain. This is par-
ticularly the case for the treaties’ generally applicable standards of treat-
ment, which have been described as “otiose,”44 “vague and open to dif-
ferent interpretations,”45 and “offer[ing only] a general point of departure 
in formulating an argument that the foreign investor has not been well 
treated.”46 
Even where the promise is relatively specific so that in theory an ob-
server might be able to tell with a reasonable degree of confidence and 
                                                                                                             
 42. See generally Beth V. Yarbrough & Robert M. Yarbrough, Reciprocity, Bilateral-
ism, and Economic ‘Hostages’: Self-Enforcing Agreements in International Trade, 30 
INT’L STUD. Q. 7 (1986). 
 43. That reputation might play a role in promoting host state compliance with interna-
tional obligations (investment related or otherwise) is an old and rather obvious idea. See, 
e.g., Roy Preiswerk, New Developments in Bilateral Investment Protection (With Special 
Reference to Belgian Practice), 3 REV. BELGE DR. INT’L 173, 195 (1967). Guzman pro-
vides a recent recycling of the idea. See Andrew T. Guzman, A Compliance-Based The-
ory of International Law, 90 CAL. L. REV. 1823, 1840–71 (2002). The real question is 
whether reputational concerns alone are sufficient to promote widespread compliance 
with BIT obligations. Preiswerk takes the position that they are; my own views, as devel-
oped below, are much more skeptical. 
 44.  SORNARAJAH, supra note 6, at 235–36. 
 45. Id. at 236. 
 46. P.T. MUCHLINSKI, MULTINATIONAL ENTERPRISES AND THE LAW 625 (1995). 
Klebes, in a memorable turn of phrase, has suggested that the vagueness of BIT promises 
renders the treaties mere “traités d’atmosphère.” Heinrich Klebes, Encouragement et 
Protection des Investissements Privés Dans les Pays en Développement: Les Traites Bila-
téraux de la République Fédérale D’Allemagne Dans Leur Contexte [Encouragement and 
Protection of Private Investments in Developing Countries: The Bilateral Treaties of the 
Federal Republic of Germany in Context] 594 (1983) (unpublished doctoral dissertation, 
L’Université de Strasbourg) (on file with author). 
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without too much effort that if fact X has occurred then promise Y has 
been breached, whether fact X did indeed occur will often be highly con-
testable. For example, the common guarantee of “prompt, adequate, and 
effective” compensation in the event of expropriation can be surprisingly 
difficult to apply to particular facts.47 Hiding behind even that modestly 
specific rule of law lurk immensely important legal questions, such as the 
proper application of expropriation law to government regulatory activ-
ity. That particular question has been left almost completely unaddressed 
in most treaties and remains far from settled theoretically or jurispruden-
tially, creating enormous legal uncertainty and fostering a growing po-
litical backlash against investment treaties.48 
This means that in most foreign investment disputes, save those arising 
from the most obvious and egregious conduct, it will be quite difficult 
for the parties or outside observers to determine whether or not a breach 
of a given promise has objectively occurred. It is even difficult for inter-
national arbitral tribunals to consistently construe and apply BIT prom-
ises.49 And where a breach is not easily identified because of either legal 
or factual uncertainty, reputational concerns are unlikely to dissuade the 
host state from acting in ways that might objectively be considered con-
trary to its treaty or other international legal promises.50 The investor, of 
course, is sure to claim the treaty has been violated, but the investor’s 
self-serving rhetoric, like the host state’s own, should not be counted on 
to reflect the true state of affairs, especially where it simply is not certain 
what a particular promise actually means.51 
                                                                                                             
 47. See Albrecht Stockmayer, Bilateral Investment Promotion Protection and Trea-
ties: A Model for Community Promotion of Mining Investment?, 4 J. ENERGY & NAT. 
RESOURCES L. 247, 253–54, 256–57 (1985); Andreas F. Lowenfeld, Introduction to 
EXPROPRIATION IN THE AMERICAS: A COMPARATIVE LAW STUDY 7 (Andreas F. Lowenfeld 
ed., 1971). 
 48. See Been & Beauvais, supra note 3, at 55. 
 49. See Susan D. Franck, The Legitimacy Crisis in Investment Treaty Arbitration: 
Privatizing Public International Law Through Inconsistent Decisions, 73 FORDHAM L. 
REV. 1521, 1545–82 (2005). 
 50. As Douglas North has emphasized more generally, “the costs of measurement and 
enforcement, discovering who is cheating whom, when free-riding will occur, and who 
should bear the cost of punishing defectors make self-enforcement ineffective in many 
situations.” NORTH, supra note 13, at 50. A major part of the difficulty arises from the 
high costs of “measuring the multiple margins that constitute contract performance.” Id. 
at 54. 
 51. I leave aside the possibility that what matters for reputational purposes is the mere 
fact that the host state and a particular investor are publicly feuding. In that case, the exis-
tence of the dispute might be taken as powerful prima facie evidence of a poor invest-
ment climate, regardless of the objective merits of any associated legal arguments or of 
the “true” factual state of affairs. The ultimate question is one of the informational value 
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In light of this discussion, it is worthwhile to briefly address Guzman’s 
more general argument (one that he has applied specifically to interna-
tional investment law) that treaties are “[t]he most formal and reliable 
international commitment” in large part because they “represent clear 
and well-defined obligations of states.”52 This conclusion begs the ques-
tion: treaties are the most formal and reliable international commitment 
in comparison to what? For Guzman, the comparison is, for the most 
part, between BITs and customary international law.53 It would be mis-
guided to argue that BITs offer no improvement over customary interna-
tional law in terms of what might be called the international legal cover-
age of investment issues. BITs typically contain many promises that have 
never been incorporated into customary international law—promises to 
permit investors to transfer funds out of the host country, promises of 
MFN treatment, promises to recognize the subrogation rights of home 
states, promises to refrain from imposing performance requirements on 
investors, and so on.54 In an absolute sense, and as I have already argued, 
these additional promises are typically framed in language that is far 
from clear and precise. In a relative sense, it is quite difficult to argue 
that customary law is less clear. Indeed, custom has nothing to say on 
these topics; whatever obligations might exist would necessarily derive 
from other sources, such as municipal law or investment contracts. 
Even where BITs do treat topics traditionally covered by customary in-
ternational law (such as expropriation), the treaties typically add little in 
the way of meaningful content, clarity, or precision. Indeed, the United 
States argues that the most important treaty promises, such as those re-
quiring “prompt, adequate, and effective” compensation, “fair and equi-
table” treatment, or “full protection and security,” merely incorporate by 
reference the same protections that were already available under cus-
tom.55 The position is not unreasonable. UNCTAD agrees that “[m]ost 
                                                                                                             
of an investor’s (or its home state’s) public claims of breach. Given inherent legal and 
factual uncertainties and strategic incentives to exaggerate and mislead, I assume that in 
many cases most third-party observers will attach little value to rhetorical claims of 
breach absent authoritative adjudication of the underlying claims. 
 52. Guzman, supra note 13, at 1873. 
 53. Id. 
 54.   Jeswald W. Salacuse & Nicholas P. Sullivan, Do BITs Really Work?: An Evalua-
tion of Bilateral Investment Treaties and Their Grand Bargain, 46 HARV. INT'L L.J. 67, 
112–13 (2005) (discussing whether BITs represent lex specialis governing only the par-
ties to the agreement or customary international law). 
 55. See Statement on NAFTA Article 1105 and the Availability of Arbitration Docu-
ments, NAFTA Commission (July 31, 2001), available at http://www.naftaclaims.com 
/commission.htm. At the instigation of the United States, NAFTA’s Free Trade Commis-
sion issued a legally binding statement to “clarify” chapter 11’s promises that “‘fair and 
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[BITs] tend to restate traditional principles of customary international 
law with respect to the treatment of foreign property abroad.”56 
The fundamental issue, then, is one of distinguishing between the exis-
tence of an obligation and its clarity of meaning or application. BITs cer-
tainly commit host states to something. That something appears to be 
largely investor friendly, but what exactly the obligation will entail in 
particular cases can be quite obscure. For that reason, it is not theoreti-
cally plausible to treat investment treaties’ core substantive promises as 
meaningfully credible in and of themselves. Indeed, there is good reason 
to suspect that investment treaties, by making broad and vague promises 
to indiscriminate classes of investors, may make disputes even more like-
ly. 
What is theoretically necessary to render BIT promises credible is in-
vestor access to authoritative adjudication.57 It is through adjudication 
that vague standards of treatment are given useful legal content58 and 
inevitable factual disputes are resolved. International arbitration, as op-
posed to adjudication in municipal courts in the host state, is said to be 
essential because investors typically assume that municipal courts in de-
veloping countries lack the technical competence or neutrality to ade-
quately and fairly resolve foreign investment disputes.59 Wälde’s recent 
and quite forceful statement of the point is worth quoting at length: 
It is the ability to access a tribunal outside the sway of the host State 
which is the principal advantage of a modern investment treaty. This 
advantage is much more significant than the applicability to the dispute 
                                                                                                             
equitable treatment’ and ‘full protection and security’ do not require treatment in addition 
to or beyond that which is required by the customary international law minimum standard 
of treatment of aliens,” and that the “minimum standard” of treatment imposed by 
NAFTA was no more than that same customary standard. Id. It has long been recognized 
that one of the primary aims of the U.S. BIT program has been to codify the United 
States’ understandings of customary international law, particularly in regard to compen-
sation for expropriation. See Kenneth J. Vandevelde, The Bilateral Investment Treaty 
Program of the United States, 21 CORNELL INT’L L.J. 201, 208 (1988). 
 56. UNCTC BILATERAL INVESTMENT TREATIES, supra note 2, at 9. 
 57. See Douglas C. North, Institutions and Credible Commitment, 149 J. INST’L & 
THEORETICAL ECON. 11, 21 (1993) (arguing that “creating the formal rules [and] creating 
and implementing a judicial system that will impartially enforce such rules” is necessary 
to solve credible commitment problems). 
 58. Indeed, some would say that by definition standards are given useful content after 
the fact through adjudication. See Louis Kaplow, Rules Versus Standards, 42 DUKE L.J. 
557, 621 (1992). 
 59. See Robert B. Shanks, Lessons in the Management of Political Risk: Infrastruc-
ture Projects (A Legal Perspective), in MANAGING INTERNATIONAL POLITICAL RISK 83, 93 
(Theodore Moran ed., 1998). 
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of substantive international law rules. The remedy trumps in terms of 
practical effectiveness the definition of the right. 
. . . 
The effectiveness of substantive rights is everywhere—but nowhere 
more so than in investment disputes—linked to the availability of an ef-
fective (i.e., independent) enforcement procedure. This link is so close 
that the best way to emasculate an investor’s right against a Host State 
is to sever the link between an international-law-based right and an in-
ternational enforcement procedure and to compel the investor to seek 
justice before domestic courts. Right and procedural remedy are, in 
practical and effective terms, one.60 
Assuming Wälde’s position is correct, the problem for BIT analysts is 
that not all BITs provide such access—neither comprehensively nor with 
absolute certainty. These extremely important differences in procedural 
(or perhaps more properly, remedial) content suggest that BITs as poten-
tial credible commitment devices are not created equal, and some treaties 
are likely to have far less value to investors than others. 
Before presenting an empirical examination of differences in BIT dis-
pute settlement procedures, let me add an important caveat. My basic 
argument thus far—that procedural differences in BITs matter conceptu-
ally—is premised on the assumption that an MFN clause in a BIT that 
does not contain an effective pre-consent to arbitration cannot be used to 
take advantage of a pre-consent provided in another treaty. This is admit-
tedly a delicate question and one that is subject to substantial debate; 
nonetheless, an arbitral tribunal is unlikely to premise jurisdiction on an 
MFN clause where the treaty otherwise provides the investor with no 
right to unilaterally initiate arbitration as to the particular dispute at 
hand.61  
                                                                                                             
 60. Wälde, supra note 13, at 190, 194 (emphasis added). Wälde is not alone in view-
ing access to arbitration as the “greatest innovation” of BITs. One arbitral tribunal has 
observed:  
The greatest innovation of ICSID and other systems directed at the protection 
of foreign investments is precisely that the rights of the investors are not any 
longer subject to the political and other considerations by their governments, as 
was the case under the old system of diplomatic protection, often resulting in an 
interference with those rights. 
Enron Corp. & Ponderosa Assets L.P. v. Argentine Rep., Decision on Jurisdiction, ICSID 
(W. Bank) No. ARB/01/3 (Aug. 2, 2004), ¶ 37. 
 61. See Jürgen Kurtz, The Delicate Extension of Most-Favored-Nation Treatment to 
Foreign Investors: Maffezini v. Kingdom of Spain, in INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW 
AND ARBITRATION: LEADING CASES FROM THE ICSID, NAFTA, BILATERAL TREATIES, AND 
CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL LAW 523, 542–51 (Todd Weiler ed., 2005) (discussing a 
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III. BITS AND DISPUTE SETTLEMENT: AN EMPIRICAL EXAMINATION 
Differences in the procedural content of BITs hold potentially impor-
tant and largely unappreciated62 theoretical significance for our under-
standing of BITs as credible commitments to treat investors favorably. 
As demonstrated above, the treaties on UNCTAD’s list vary substantially 
in terms of the procedural guarantees they offer investors.63 This Section 
presents a systematic, empirical indication of the degree of variation us-
ing a four-fold classification scheme.64 I first describe each of the four 
categories, then present Figures illustrating how the dispute settlement 
content of BITs has changed over time. 
 
1. Comprehensive, Effective Pre-Consents (“strong BITs”). BITs with 
the greatest capacity to function as meaningful credible commitment de-
vices are those that contain comprehensive, effective pre-consents to in-
vestor-initiated arbitration. In these truly modern treaties, each state 
agrees in advance of any particular dispute to allow future investors to 
                                                                                                             
number of ICSID arbitral decisions in which a party to a dispute invoked the MFN clause 
in one treaty as the basis for a claim to expand the substantive protection of another  
treaty and the need to reintroduce formal limitations on the ostensibly broad  
language of the typical MFN clause); Luke Eric Peterson, Majority Frowns on Using 
MFN Clause to Obtain Wider Arbitration Options, INV. TREATY NEWS (Int’l Institute  
for Sustainable Development, Winnipeg), Jan. 11, 2008 (Can.), available at 
http://www.iisd.org/pdf/2008/itn_jan11_2008/pdf. 
 62. That is, unappreciated by observers other than lawyers practicing in the field of 
investment arbitration. 
 63. My results are compatible with those of Koremenos, though my methodology and 
focus are different. Koremenos presents results from a study of the dispute settlement 
provisions in a random sample of treaties of all types (i.e., not just investment treaties) 
published in the United Nations Treaty Series (“UNTS”). See generally Barbara Kore-
menos, If Only Half of International Agreements Have Dispute Resolution Provisions, 
Which Half Needs Explaining?, 36 J. LEGAL STUDIES 189 (2007). Koremenos finds that 
among treaties containing dispute resolution provisions, fifty percent include arbitration 
provisions. Id. at 190. But, it is important to note that her sample is drawn from UNTS 
treaties between states, so she refers only to provisions providing for interstate arbitra-
tion, not arbitration between states and private parties. Virtually all of the BITs in my 
dataset contain interstate arbitration provisions, though in practice they are very rarely 
used. The well-known ELSI case, based on the interstate arbitration provisions in the 
United States-Italy friendship, commerce and navigation (“FCN”) treaty, provides the 
exception that proves the rule. Case Concerning Elettronica Sicula, S.P.A (ELSI) (U.S. v. 
Italy), 1989 I.C.J. 15 (July, 20 1989). Very few developing countries reliably publish 
their BITs in the UNTS, making the UNTS a poor source of information about treaties 
involving such countries, which may impact the reliability of a BIT study. For a defini-
tion and detailed discussion of FCN treaties, see infra Section IV.B. 
 64. My classification scheme draws heavily on CHRISTOPH H. SCHREUER, THE ICSID 
CONVENTION: A COMMENTARY 191–224 (2001). 
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unilaterally initiate arbitration in the event of an investment dispute, 
broadly defined, before particular arbitral tribunals. These pre-consent 
clauses can be either explicit or implicit.65 The ICSID is a frequent forum 
of choice for BIT pre-consents,66 although pre-consents may also permit 
ad hoc arbitration (where the dispute is settled under custom-made rules), 
semi-ad-hoc arbitration (where the dispute is settled under model rules of 
international arbitration, such as those provided by the U.N. Commission 
on International Trade Law),67 or privately organized institutional arbi-
tration (such as through the International Chamber of Commerce).68 In 
any of these cases, the host state will find it very difficult to convince an 
arbitral tribunal to decline to authoritatively decide an investment dispute 
once the investor has accepted the state’s standing treaty-based offer to 
arbitrate.69 Arbitral tribunals tend to generously interpret pre-consents to 
arbitrate,70 and given the very real possibility of an adverse default 
award,71 states have an incentive to participate in proceedings. Just as 
importantly, investors benefiting from a favorable arbitral award can re-
liably collect upon it, even in the face of host state intransigence, by 
                                                                                                             
 65. For example, an explicit pre-consent might provide that “Each Contracting Party 
hereby consents to the submission of an investment dispute to international arbitration.” 
SCHREUER, supra note 64, at 214 (quoting Accord entre la Confederation suisse et la Re-
publique du Ghana concernant la promotion reciproque des investissements, Switz.-
Ghana, art. 12, June 15, 1999). Implicit pre-consents include those that contain “formula-
tions to the effect that a dispute ‘shall be submitted’ to [arbitration] or that [the investor 
has] the right to initiate proceedings.” Id. at 213. The German Model Agreement provides 
a typical example: “If the divergency cannot be settled within six months . . . it shall, at 
the request of the [investor], be submitted for arbitration. Unless the parties to the dispute 
agree otherwise, the divergency shall be submitted for arbitration [to ICSID].” Id. (citing 
German Model Agreement). 
 66. See MOSHE HIRSCH, THE ARBITRATION MECHANISM OF THE INTERNATIONAL 
CENTER FOR THE SETTLEMENT OF INVESTMENT DISPUTES 22 (1993). A state that has rati-
fied the ICSID Convention agrees to abide by ICSID’s rules and is eligible to use the 
ICSID system to resolve investment disputes. Id. at 31. However, investors may not initi-
ate arbitration against the ratifying state by merely ratifying the ICSID Convention. Id. at 
21. Some further expression of state consent to arbitrate is necessary, thus creating a need 
for consents in BITs, national law, or an investment contract. Id. 
 67. See generally ARON BROCHES, COMMENTARY ON THE UNCITRAL MODEL LAW ON 
INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION (1990). 
 68. International Chamber of Commerce [ICC], Welcome to ICC Dispute Resolution 
Services, http://www.iccwbo.org/court/ (last visited Mar. 11, 2008). 
 69. See SCHREUER, supra note 64, at 219. 
 70. Id. at 212–13. 
 71. ICSID Convention, supra note 4, art. 45. 
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bringing an enforcement action in the courts of third states in which the 
host state might have assets.72 
 
2. Limited, Effective Pre-Consents (“partial pre-consent BITs”). A cer-
tain number of BITs contain pre-consents of extremely limited scope. 
These treaties offer the state’s consent to arbitrate only certain kinds of 
disputes—typically disputes over the amount of compensation due in 
cases of expropriation and sometimes disputes over the freedom to trans-
fer investments and proceeds out of the host state.73 Completely excluded 
are disputes relating to the treaty’s other substantive promises. The la-
cuna is conceptually significant for at least two reasons. First, and most 
importantly, BITs derive much of their credible commitment power from 
giving investors the ability to threaten the host state with litigation over 
the meaning and applicability of vague substantive promises, like “fair 
and equitable treatment,” in order to persuade the host state to abandon 
or avoid a wide range of potential actions adverse to the investor’s inter-
ests.74 Excluding the possibility of litigation over such matters removes 
the most important arrow from the investor’s quiver. Second, while pro-
tecting against the threat of uncompensated expropriation was the princi-
pal concern of investors of an earlier era,75 today the risk of such expro-
priation, as it is traditionally understood, is objectively slight.76 This sug-
                                                                                                             
 72. The New York Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbi-
tral Awards and the ICSID Convention both provide investors with powerful enforcement 
tools. The New York Convention requires courts of contracting states to enforce interna-
tional arbitral awards unless one of several strict conditions are met. Convention on the 
Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, arts. III–V, June 10, 1958, 21 
U.S.T 2517, 330 U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter New York Convention]. The ICSID Convention 
requires the courts of contracting states to enforce ICSID awards as if they were final 
judgments by a domestic court (e.g., with no possibility of collateral attack). See ICSID 
Convention, supra note 4, art. 54. A recent example that illustrates how valuable these 
enforcement provisions can be involves a German investor who won an investment treaty 
award against the Russian government and was able to enforce the award by seizing “a 
$40 million Russian-owned apartment complex in Cologne that once served as the local 
KGB outpost.” David Crawford, Businessman vs. Kremlin: War of Attrition, WALL ST. J., 
Mar. 6, 2006, at A6. 
 73. These treaties typically involved Communist states. Many remain in force in the 
post-Communist era, including BITs involving Russia and China. See Luke Eric Peter-
son, Interpreting Narrowly-Worded Arbitration Clauses in Soviet-era and Chinese BITs, 
INV. TREATY NEWS (Int’l Institute for Sustainable Development, Winnipeg), Jan. 17, 
2008 (Can.). 
 74. See Preiswerk, supra note 43, at 195. 
 75. Wälde, supra note 13, at 201. 
 76. Michael Minor, The Demise of Expropriation as an Instrument of LDC Policy, 
1980–1992, 25 J. INT’L BUS. STUD. 177, 178 (1994) (discussing the decline in expropria-
tions from the late 1970s through 1992). See also UNCTAD TRENDS IN INTERNATIONAL 
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gests that treaties that provide guaranteed access to arbitration only for 
expropriation disputes fail to cover the most common modern sources of 
investor-state tension. While it is difficult to say precisely how much less 
valuable these kinds of treaties are compared to those that offer investors 
comprehensive pre-consents, presumably they are significantly less valu-
able. 
 
3. Promissory Pre-Consents (“promissory BITs”). Pre-consent to in-
vestor-initiated, enforceable arbitration for a wide range of investment 
disputes may seriously constrain a host state’s policy autonomy. For that 
reason, a number of states have sought to limit their exposure to adverse 
awards and to preserve a greater degree of policy autonomy vis-à-vis 
foreign investors by offering carefully tailored promises to consent to 
arbitration rather than actual pre-consents.77 As Schreuer suggests, the 
difference between a consent and a promise to consent is legally quite 
significant.78 When a state has promised to consent to arbitration in a 
treaty, a refusal to actually consent when the investor so demands is in-
deed a breach of the treaty under international law. But in the face of 
such a refusal, no matter how illegal, an international arbitral tribunal 
will not exercise jurisdiction over the dispute because arbitral jurisdiction 
always and necessarily depends on the actual consent of the parties.79 
This much is quite clear. Less clear is whether the reputational costs of 
breaching a promise to arbitrate will typically be so great that a promise 
to consent is for all practical purposes of as much value to the investor as 
an actual pre-consent. BITs incorporating promissory pre-consents are 
arguably of significantly less credible commitment value to investors 
than are treaties containing true pre-consents precisely because the inves-
                                                                                                             
INVESTMENT AGREEMENTS, supra note 2, at 17 & 18 fig.1 (nationalization and expropria-
tion peaked in the 1970s). 
 77. For an excellent example of a promissory pre-consent, see article 11 of the 
Agreement between Japan and the Democratic Socialist Republic of Sri Lanka Concern-
ing the Promotion and Protection of Investment, which provides “Each Contracting Party 
shall, at the request of the [investor], consent to submit any legal dispute . . . to concilia-
tion or arbitration.” Agreement between Japan and the Democratic Socialist Republic of 
Sri Lanka Concerning the Promotion and Protection of Investment, art. 11, Aug. 7, 1982, 
1358 U.N.T.S 272. 
 78. SCHREUER, supra note 64, at 216. 
 79. But once consent has been given and accepted by the other party, it can be diffi-
cult or impossible for one party to withdraw its consent unilaterally. See ICSID Conven-
tion, supra note 4, art. 25(1) (“When the parties have given their consent, no party may 
withdraw its consent unilaterally.”). This rule is what makes a BIT pre-consent effec-
tive—once offered by the host state and accepted by the investor, the host state cannot 
meaningfully avoid its obligation to arbitrate at the investor’s choosing. 
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tor cannot reliably count on the host state’s reputational concerns to en-
sure the investor’s access to arbitration once a major investment dispute 
arises. 
 
4. No Pre-Consent (“weak BITs”). Finally, many early BITs contain 
no investor-state dispute-settlement provisions whatsoever. A handful of 
these early treaties contain merely hortatory expressions of willingness to 
consider arbitration.80 The lack of meaningful dispute settlement provi-
sions means that these kinds of treaties have little, if any, theoretical po-
tential to credibly commit host states to treat investors favorably, and 
they are easily considered the weakest of the four kinds of treaties from a 
credible commitment perspective. 
Figure 3 illustrates the results of a comprehensive analysis of investor-
state dispute settlement provisions in the BITs of the top eighteen most 
significant capital-exporting states by FDI volume81 based on full-text 
copies of the various treaties.82 Each BIT’s dispute settlement provision 
is coded according to the four categories above.83 Any categorization 
exercise inevitably raises a number of case-specific considerations of 
often quite subtle distinction, but because Figure 3 is intended largely for 
illustrative purposes of a general sort, a comprehensive discussion of 
those difficulties or of their resolution has been omitted.84 In the vast ma-
jority of cases, treaty coding was straightforward. 
 
 
 
                                                                                                             
 80. For example, the Agreement on the Protection of Investments between the King-
dom of the Netherlands and the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, signed on Feb-
ruary 16, 1976, provides that the host state “shall give sympathetic consideration to any 
request” by the investor to arbitrate a dispute. SCHREUER, supra note 64, at 217. 
 81. See supra note 32 for a list of the top eighteen capital exporting states. 
 82. In seven instances I was unable to obtain a full text of the relevant treaty. In each 
of these cases I evaluated the treaty as containing an effective and comprehensive pre-
consent based on each treaty partner’s contemporaneous BIT practice, though the evalua-
tion is at best an educated guess. 
 83. Where possible I evaluated each treaty’s content in its official language or as 
professionally translated by the United Nations. Where a treaty was available only in a 
language that I do not read (in nearly all cases Italian or German), a native speaker evalu-
ated or translated the relevant passages. 
 84. For more details regarding the coding exercise, see Jason Webb Yackee, Sacrific-
ing Sovereignty: Bilateral Investment Treaties, International Arbitration, and the Quest 
for Capital (2007) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of North Carolina at Cha-
pel Hill) (on file with author). 
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Figure 3. Cumulative BITs in Force, Disaggregated by Dispute Settlement 
Provisions, 1959–2002 (18 Capital-Exporting Countries) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The solid line in Figure 3 shows the cumulative number of signed BITs 
through 1999 as listed on UNCTAD’s year 2000 list.85 By UNCTAD’s 
count, there is a steady rise in the number of signed BITs beginning in 
1959 (the year that Germany signed a BIT with Pakistan)86 up until the 
                                                                                                             
 85. UNCTAD’s list contains some obvious errors and omissions. Notably missing 
from the UNCTAD list, for example, are a relatively large number of Germany’s early 
BITs, including those with Kenya, the Philippines, Ghana, Colombia, and Chile. This 
absence is puzzling because UNCTAD’s list includes other German BITs that failed to 
enter into force, such as its 1964 BIT with Ethiopia. UNCTAD’s list also leaves out a 
BIT-equivalent 1964 “exchange of letters” between Germany and India. For a compre-
hensive list and detailed discussion of these early German BITs, see generally Klebes, 
supra note 46. UNCTAD’s list also curiously contains a number of French investment 
guarantee treaties (“IGTs”) that provide rules relating exclusively to investments insured 
by the French government and that do not contain the core protections contained in most 
BITs. UNCTAD also includes a number of French “establishment” treaties with certain 
states in the Communauté française d’Afrique (“CFA”). These treaties are very different 
from the typical BIT. 
 86. The 1959 Germany-Pakistan BIT is the earliest BIT listed in UNCTAD’s various 
lists of treaties. UNCTC BILATERAL INVESTMENT TREATIES, supra note 2, at 8. Empirical 
studies of BITs also tend to treat the Germany-Pakistan BIT as the first treaty of interest. 
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late 1980s and early 1990s, when a more dramatic increase is visible. A 
comparison of UNCTAD’s aggregate count of signed BITs with a count 
of BITs differentiated by category on the basis of dispute settlement pro-
visions, including free trade agreements and friendship, commerce, and 
navigation treaties (“FCN treaties”) with BIT-equivalent investment pro-
visions, as reflected in Figure 3 suggests a much more complex series of 
trends than the UNCTAD list alone.87 The following analysis focuses on 
BITs that have entered into force, rather than on BITs that have merely 
been signed (empirical BIT analysts usually use UNCTAD’s count of 
signed BITs to create their measures of BIT-based credible commit-
ment), for a number of practical and theoretical reasons. 
As a practical matter, it can be difficult both for the investor and the 
analyst to determine whether a signed treaty that has not entered into 
force actually exists, and if it exists, what it might contain. States supply 
copies of a signed treaty to the United Nations for publication in the 
United Nations Treaty Series rather haphazardly and only after entry into 
force (sometimes long after); they tend to publish the text of a treaty in 
their national legislative gazettes only after ratification. It is only very 
recently that capital-exporting states—and rarely developing countries—
have begun to post reasonably up-to-date, comprehensive, and accessible 
lists of their BITs online. Even in these cases, links to the treaty text may 
not be provided, especially if the treaty is not yet ratified or in force.88 
                                                                                                             
See, e.g., Neumayer & Spess, supra note 8, at 1569. A number of commentators have 
repeated the assertion that the Germany-Pakistan treaty is the “first BIT” or the “first 
modern BIT.” See, e.g., Jeswald W. Salacuse, BIT by BIT: The Growth of Bilateral In-
vestment Treaties and Their Impact on Foreign Investment in Developing Countries, 24 
INT’L LAW. 655, 657 (1990); Charles N. Brower & Jeremy K. Sharpe, Notes and Com-
ments: International Arbitration and the Islamic World: Third Phase, 97 AM. J. INT’L L. 
643, 647 n.30 (2003); SORNARAJAH, supra note 6, at 204 n.1. 
 87. For a definition and detailed discussion of FCN treaties, see infra Section IV.B. 
Most FCN treaties are essentially weak BITs because they contain no investor-state arbi-
tration provisions. As discussed in the next Section, UNCTAD’s list ignores these multi-
lateral treaties. I have also corrected for the obvious mistakes discussed supra note 85. 
 88. ICSID has sponsored a loose-leaf collection of BITs that does an admirable job of 
obtaining and publishing the texts of the earlier treaties, but the collection’s coverage of 
later treaties is quite spotty and incomplete. See INVESTMENT PROMOTION AND 
PROTECTION TREATIES, Binder Series I–VII (Int’l Center for Settlement of Inv. Disputes 
ed., Oceana Publications 2002). UNCTAD has recently developed an on-line  
repository of BIT texts, though important gaps in the collection remain, especially for 
treaties between developing countries, recently signed treaties, and treaties that are  
no longer in force. See UNCTAD, Investment Instruments On-line Database, 
http://www.unctad.org/Templates/Page.asp?intItemID=3775&lang=1 (last visited Mar. 
11, 2008). 
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More theoretically, treaties that have been signed but that have not en-
tered into force have minimal credible commitment potential. My review 
of the texts of the various treaties suggests that almost all BITs provide 
that they shall not enter into force until some period of time after ratifica-
tion by the parties to the treaty.89 By itself, the act of signing a BIT nei-
ther creates an obligation to ratify the instrument nor establishes the sign-
ing parties’ consent to be bound by the treaty.90 Consequently, when a 
treaty has not entered into force, its substantive and procedural provi-
sions are unlikely to have any legal force. Most critically for the foreign 
investor, arbitral tribunals are unlikely to accept jurisdiction on the basis 
of a treaty-based state pre-consent when the treaty has been signed but is 
not yet in force.91 
What makes Figure 3 most interesting is its illustration that the BIT 
phenomenon—understood as one of credible commitment through the 
entry into force of “strong” BITs—began a decade later than is com-
monly recognized. The first BIT to enter into force that contained a full-
fledged arbitral pre-consent was a 1969 treaty between Italy and Chad.92 
Germany’s 1959 treaty with Pakistan, which UNCTAD credits as the 
first BIT, contains no investor-state dispute settlement provisions of any 
                                                                                                             
 89. As a general matter, whether a treaty must be ratified before entering into force 
depends on whether the parties to the particular treaty intend it to be subject to domestic 
ratification procedures. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties art. 14, May 23, 1969, 
1155 U.N.T.S. 331. My review of BIT texts, described in more detail below, suggests 
that the vast majority of the treaties explicitly state that they shall be subject to ratifica-
tion prior to entry into force. 
 90. See IAN BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 582–83 (6th ed. 
2003). 
 91. UNCTAD, Many BITs Have Yet to Enter into Force, at 6, U.N. Doc. 
UNCTAD/WEB/ITE/IIA/2005/10 (Nov. 2, 2005). The study notes, for example, that 
none of Brazil’s fourteen BITs, nor any of Colombia’s four BITs, have entered into force. 
More generally, the study notes that as of 2004, of 2392 signed BITs, 674 had not entered 
into force; of those, more than 300 had been signed more than five years earlier suggest-
ing that their prospects for eventual entry into force are slim. Id. at 1. Countries in some 
geographic regions were more unlikely to have ratified their signed BITs than those in 
other geographic regions. Id. at 4. For example, only forty-four percent of African BITs 
had entered into force, a percentage significantly lower than the equivalent figures for 
other regions. Id. at 4. 
 92. Accord entre le Gouvernement de la République Italienne et le Gouvernement de 
la République du Chad en Vue de Protéger et de Favoriser Les Investissements de Capi-
taux [Agreement between the Government of the Italian Republic and the Government of 
the Republic of Chad with the Aim of Protecting and Promoting Capital Investments] art. 
7, June 11, 1969, reprinted in INVESTMENT LAWS OF THE WORLD, at Binder I (Int’l Center 
for Settlement of Inv. Disputes ed., Oceana Publications 2002). 
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kind.93 Figure 3 also demonstrates that the BIT phenomenon—again, 
understood as the entry into force of strong BITs—was much more mod-
est in scope in the 1970s and 1980s than is typically assumed. For exam-
ple, the number of in-force strong BITs remained under one hundred un-
til 1990, and throughout most of the 1980s the majority of BITs in force 
did not contain strong dispute settlement provisions. 
Figure 3 also shows that a fair number of weak BITs remain in force. 
Truly weak BITs—those containing no effective investor-state dispute 
settlement provisions—are not atypical. Since the mid-1970s at least one 
hundred weak BITs entered into and remain in force. Also, a significant 
number of in-force BITs contain pre-consents of the markedly inferior 
“expropriation only” type (sixty-six to be exact). Finally, BITs with 
promissory pre-consents are relatively rare. In 2002, only twenty-eight of 
these kinds of treaties were in force, and capital-exporting states were 
especially prone to use them. For example, six of Japan’s nine BITs con-
tain promissory pre-consents, as do ten of Australia’s eighteen BITs.94 
Figure 4 considers in more detail the BIT programs of France and 
Germany.95 Historically, both states have been very important sources of 
investment capital.96 Moreover, France and Germany were at the fore-
front of the BIT phenomenon as UNCTAD identifies it, signing large 
numbers of treaties in the 1960s and 1970s. But, few, if any, of these 
states’ early treaties contain comprehensive, effective pre-consents to 
arbitration. It is particularly striking to note that German investors did 
not enjoy the protections of a modern BIT until 1988 when Germany’s 
treaty with Nepal entered into force.97 This is striking precisely because 
it is so often claimed that Germany initiated the BIT phenomenon, and 
                                                                                                             
 93.  See Treaty for the Protection of Investment, W. Ger.-Pak., Nov. 25, 1959, 457 
U.N.T.S. 23. Regarding UNCTAD’s credit to this treaty as the first BIT, see also supra 
note 86 and authorities cited therein. 
 94. Australia’s eighteen BITs are listed in Yackee, supra note 84, at 241. Australia’s 
BITs generally contain a comprehensive, effective pre-consent to ad hoc arbitration, but 
only if Australia and its treaty partner have not joined the ICSID Convention. See, e.g., 
Agreement between the Government of Australia and the Government of the Republic of 
Indonesia Concerning the Promotion and Protection of Investments art. XI(3), July 29, 
1993, 1770 U.N.T.S. 302. Where they both have done so, the ad hoc option disappears, 
and the investor’s sole option is to seek ICSID arbitration. Id. at art. XI(4)(a). With re-
spect to ICSID arbitration, each state party to the treaty promises only that it “shall con-
sent in writing to the submission of the dispute to the Centre within forty-five days of 
receiving such a request from the investor.” Id. 
 95. For clarity of presentation, Figure 2 does not include French and German BITs 
that contain promissory or partial pre-consents. Doing so adds only six BITs to each 
state’s count. 
 96. Elkins et al., supra note 7, at 818. 
 97. UNCTAD BITs 1959–1999, supra note 2, at 58. 
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the success of its early BIT program was regarded with something ap-
proaching jealousy.98 In fact, however, measured by the presence of 
comprehensive, effective pre-consents, Germany’s BIT program appears 
to be neither first nor substantively very important. Indeed, over the en-
tire period of study, France had more strong BITs in force than Germany. 
 
Figure 4. Cumulative Number of Signed BITs versus Strong BITs in 
Force, Germany and France 1959–2002 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5, below, presents the data from a somewhat different angle. It 
compares the annual number of LDCs with at least one strong BIT in 
force against the annual number of LDCs with no strong BITs in force, 
beginning with Chad’s 1969 treaty with Italy.99 Figure 5 provides further 
                                                                                                             
 98. See supra note 86 and authorities cited therein (regarding the Germany-Pakistan 
BIT as the first BIT). Germany’s early success in convincing developing countries to 
enter into BITs has been cited as an important impetus for the United States govern-
ment’s decision to revamp its own BIT program in the late 1970s. See, e.g., Vandevelde, 
supra note 55, at 208. The basic U.S. concern seems to have been that Germany’s treaties 
gave German investors a competitive advantage over their U.S. counterparts. See id. 
 99. Accord entre le Gouvernement de la République Italienne et le Gouvernement de 
la République du Chad en Vue de Protéger et de Favoriser Les Investissements de Capi-
taux, supra note 92. 
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evidence that strong BITs did not become a numerically significant phe-
nomenon until the late 1980s and early 1990s. Until 1993, a majority of 
capital-importing states had not entered into a strong BIT with a major 
capital-exporting country. But by the end of the sample (2002), 117 out 
of 149 developing countries—seventy-nine percent—had at least one 
strong BIT in force. 
 
Figure 5. LDCs with One Strong BIT in Force vs. No Strong BITs in 
Force 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
   
 
IV. THE NEED TO CONSIDER BIT-EQUIVALENT MEANS OF CREDIBLE 
COMMITMENT 
The previous Section demonstrates that how analysts count BITs has 
important consequences for understanding both the timing and scope of 
the BIT phenomenon, understood as one of treaty-based credible com-
mitment. There are a number of additional reasons to be wary of exclu-
sive reliance on UNCTAD’s list of BITs for theoretically driven empiri-
cal inquiry. These additional problems stem from UNCTAD’s focus on 
treaties that are bilateral and that deal exclusively with investment. 
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reflect the extent to which alternative policy instruments can act as rea-
sonably effective substitutes for BITs.100 
A. The Irrelevancy of Bilateralism 
That an investment treaty is bilateral rather than multilateral is not 
relevant to the treaty’s potential value as a credible commitment device. 
While it is true that the most ambitious attempts to create investment 
treaties of worldwide scope have failed,101 there are important multilat-
eral success stories. Chapter 11 of the North American Free Trade 
Agreement (“NAFTA”) is the most well known example.102 Other note-
worthy examples include the Association of Southeast Asian Nations’ 
(“ASEAN”) Agreement for the Promotion and Protection of Invest-
ments,103 the Colonia Protocol for the Reciprocal Promotion and Protec-
tion of Investments in MERCOSUR,104 and chapter 17 of the 1994 free 
trade agreement between Colombia, Venezuela, and Mexico.105 The mul-
                                                                                                             
 100. In fairness to UNCTAD, the organization certainly recognizes that BITs are not 
the only international agreements of potential relevance to investors, and many of its 
publications conjointly discuss and analyze BITs along with a broader class of interna-
tional investment agreements. 
 101. See, e.g., OECD, Multilateral Agreement on Investment Draft Consolidated Text, 
Apr. 22, 1998, available at http://www1.oecd.org/daf/mai/pdf/ng/ng987r1e.pdf. Multilat-
eral Agreement on Investment negotiations began in 1995 and were discontinued in  
April 1998. The draft consolidates the text of the agreement considered in the  
course of the negotiations. See OECD Multilateral Agreement on Investment, 
http://www.oecd.org/document/22/0,2340,en_2649_201185_1894819_1_1_1_1,00.html. 
 102. North American Free Trade Agreement ch. 11, U.S.-Can.-Mex., Dec. 17, 1992, 
32 I.L.M. 289 (1993) [hereinafter NAFTA]. 
 103. The original parties to the 1987 ASEAN agreement were Brunei Darussalam, 
Indonesia, the Philippines, Singapore, and Thailand. See Agreement among the Govern-
ment of Brunei Darussalam, the Republic of Indonesia, Malaysia, the Republic of the 
Philippines, the Republic of Singapore, and the Kingdome of Thailand for the Promotion 
and Protection of Investments, Dec. 15, 1987, 27 I.L.M. 612. Laos, Myanmar, and Viet-
nam later joined as well. See Framework Agreement on ASEAN Investment Area, Oct. 7, 
1998, available at http://www.aseansec.org/12815.htm. 
 104. Protocolo de Colonia para la Promoción Recíproco de Inversiones en el 
MERCOSUR [Colonia Protocol for the Promotion and Reciprocal Protections of Invest-
ments in MERCOSUR], Mar. 26, 1991, available at http://www.sice.oas.org/ 
Trade/MRCSR/colonia/pcolonia_s.asp. MERCOSUR, Mercado Común del Sur or the 
Southern Common Market, is comprised of Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay, and Uruguay. 
See www.sice.oas.org. 
 105. Tratado e Libre Comercio entre los Estados Unidos Mexicanos, la República de 
Columbia y la República de Venezuela [Free Trade Treaty between the Mexican United 
States, the Republic of Colombia and the Republic of Venezuela] (ACE No. 33),  
Ch. XVII, June 13, 1994, available at http://www.sice.oas.org/Trade/go3/ 
G3INDICE.ASP. Venezuela denounced the treaty in 2006. Comunicado de Prensa, Go-
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tilateral 1994 Energy Charter Treaty (“ECT”) is also significant because 
it regulates energy-sector investments (broadly defined) among over fifty 
states.106 Analysts are hard pressed to justify the exclusion of these multi-
lateral treaties from their samples since it is beyond cavil that these trea-
ties offer investors substantive and procedural promises that are formally 
and functionally equivalent to those provided in modern BITs. 
There are more difficult cases. Take, for example, the 1982 League of 
Arab States’ Treaty for the Investment of Arab Capital in Arab States, 
which has been signed by twenty-two states and ratified by twenty.107 
While the tone and content of this particular agreement are undeniably 
less investor friendly than modern BITs, the treaty does offer investors 
(sometimes carefully hedged) promises of MFN and national treatment, 
freedom to transfer investment proceeds, the right to “fair” compensation 
in the event of non-discriminatory expropriation, and the right to “com-
pensation . . . equivalent to damages” in the event the host state breaches 
the treaty.108 The treaty also offers investors the option to bring suit 
against a breaching host state before the Arab Investment Court, a spe-
cialized dispute settlement body that came into being in 1988.109 Whether 
this multi-lateral agreement should or should not be considered a BIT 
equivalent need not be answered definitively here; the larger point is that 
the careful analyst will need to carefully consider whether it should be 
counted as one for the particular analysis at hand. 
                                                                                                             
bierno Bolivariano de Venezuela Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores, Venezuela Formal-
izo Denuncia del G-3 [Press Release, Bolivarian Government of Venezuela Ministry of 
Foreign Relations, Venezuela Formally Denounces G-3] (May 31, 2006), available at 
http://www.mre.gov.ve/Noticias/A2006/comunic-142.htm. 
 106. Final Act of the European Energy Charter Conference, Dec. 12, 1994, 34 I.L.M. 
373. For more information about the ECT, see www.encharter.org/index.jsp. 
 107. For a copy of the Arab League treaty, see 2 UNCTAD’s INTERNATIONAL 
INVESTMENT INSTRUMENTS: A COMPENDIUM 211 (1996). The treaty has been signed by 
Algeria, Bahrain, Comoros, Djibouti, Egypt, Iraq, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Libya, Mau-
ritania, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Syria, Somalia, Sudan, Tunisia, the United Arab 
Emirates, and Yemen, and has been ratified by all of these states except Algeria and Co-
moros. Id. 
 108. League of Arab States’ Treaty for the Investment of Arab Capital in Arab States 
in 2 UNCTAD’s INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT INSTRUMENTS: A COMPENDIUM 211, supra 
note 107, art. 6(2) (affording MFN treatment on the basis of terms afforded non-Arab 
investors in similar field); arts. 6(1), 8(1), 15 (affording foreign investors treatment simi-
lar to Arab investors); arts. 2, 7 (establishing free transfers of capital and investment rev-
enues); art. 9(2)(a) (establishing fair compensation for expropriation); art. 10 (describing 
compensation for damages). 
 109. See generally Walid Ben Hamida, The First Arab Investment Court Decision, 7 J. 
WORLD INV. & TRADE 699 (2006). 
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Incorporating multilateral investment agreements into existing analyses 
of BITs can also raise potentially difficult problems of weighting and 
double-counting. For example, several ASEAN members have signed 
BITs between themselves, both prior to and after signing the ASEAN 
agreement’s BIT-like investment provisions. To cite just two cases, 
Vietnam joined ASEAN in 1995, but had already signed BITs with Indo-
nesia, Thailand, Malaysia, and the Philippines as of 1992.110 Thailand, an 
original member of ASEAN, signed the 1987 ASEAN investment 
agreement, yet subsequently signed BITs with the Philippines and Indo-
nesia in 1995 and 1998 respectively.111 This practice raises a potential 
problem of double-counting that should be taken into account before 
blindly adding an additional seven BITs to each ASEAN member coun-
try’s total. 
Incorporating the ECT into existing analyses poses a particularly sig-
nificant challenge because unlike most BITs the ECT is a sector-specific 
agreement. For example, the obligations undertaken by two countries to 
each other under the ECT are not of the same import as those undertaken 
in a BIT of general application between the same two states, and the 
presence or absence of a sector-specific agreement like the ECT neces-
sarily needs to be appropriately weighted. The most obvious scheme 
would consider the relative importance of the energy sector to the mem-
ber states’ total potential supply of FDI. But whatever scheme is ulti-
mately adopted, it is clear that weight of some sort should usually be 
given. Because of the sheer number of countries that have bound them-
selves to it,112 analysts should not ignore the ECT’s existence. 
B. The Irrelevance of Exclusivity 
As noted above, UNCTAD identifies the 1959 Germany-Pakistan 
treaty as the first BIT.113 This claim is accurate in the sense that this par-
ticular treaty is, apparently, the first to deal exclusively with investment-
related issues independently of other commercial issues. The conceptual 
                                                                                                             
 110. UNCTAD BITs 1959–1999, supra note 2, at 120. 
 111. Id. at 109. 
 112. Fifty-one states have currently signed the ECT. Using the standard mathematical 
formula for calculating combinations of pairs,  
N! / ((N − 2)! × 2) 
the ECT may be viewed as representing the rough equivalent of 1275 BITs. Of course, 
that number ignores the ECT’s limited sectoral coverage. In addition, because many ECT 
states have also already signed comprehensive BITs with other ECT states, there is an 
issue of double-counting. 
 113.   See supra note 86 and authorities cited therein. 
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problem is that exclusivity of subject matter is hardly sufficient to distin-
guish the Germany-Pakistan treaty from a host of other previous and 
contemporaneous commercial treaties as credible commitment devices. 
For example, FCN treaties provided (and sometimes still provide) inves-
tors with important investment-related guarantees while also addressing 
issues related to trade in goods, freedom of navigation, and the like.114 
To appreciate the potential scope of the issue, note that the United 
States has negotiated FCN-type treaties since the early days of the Re-
public.115 France,116 Germany,117 Japan,118 and the United Kingdom119 
have pursued roughly similar commercial treaty programs. The primary 
focus of the earliest commercial treaties was the regulation of trade and 
merchant relations; issues primarily of interest to investors were covered 
only accidentally or incidentally.120 Over time the treaties became more 
concerned with investment-specific needs, and after World War II the 
United States concluded a series of twenty-one FCNs with a wide variety 
of developed and developing countries.121 A “major purpose” of the post-
war FCNs was to “to protect . . . investment abroad.”122 Many FCN-type 
treaties are still in force and they are occasionally invoked by or on be-
half of investors before municipal and international tribunals.123 Most 
                                                                                                             
 114. UNCTC BILATERAL INVESTMENT TREATIES, supra note 2, at 3–4 (noting the “very 
broad scope” of such treaties, listing the wide variety of protections they provide, and that 
these treaties are no longer being negotiated but many remain in effect). 
 115. The “first treaty of this type signed by the United States was the Treaty of Amity 
and Commerce with France (1778).” ROBERT RENBERT WILSON, UNITED STATES 
COMMERCIAL TREATIES AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 2 (1960). 
 116. For a discussion of early French FCN-type “establishment” treaties, see generally 
ROY PREISWERK, LA PROTECTION DES INVESTISSEMENTS PRIVÉS DANS LES TRAITÉS 
BILATÉRAUX (1963). 
 117. Id. 
 118. See Yoshiro Matsui, Japan’s International Legal Policy for the Protection of 
Foreign Investment, 32 JAPANESE ANN. INT’L LAW 1, 3 (1989). 
 119. See Robin Burnett, Negotiation of International Agreements in the Field of Com-
merce and Investment—Problems of Relevance to Newly-Independent States, 9 J. WORLD 
TRADE L. 231, 235 (1975). 
 120. Herman Walker, Jr., Treaties for the Encouragement and Protection of Foreign 
Investment: Present United States Practice, 5 AM. J. COMP. L. 229, 230 (1958). 
 121. See Vandevelde, supra note 55, at 207 nn.53 & 60. 
 122. Kenneth J. Vandevelde, Sustainable Liberalism and the International Investment 
Regime, 19 MICH. J. INT’L L. 373, 382–83 (1998). For citations to the major historical 
academic studies of the U.S. FCN program, see id. at 383 n.72. 
 123. See, e.g., Case Concerning Elettronica Sicula S.P.A (ELSI) (U.S. v. Italy), 1989 
I.C.J. 15 (July, 20 1989) (invoking the U.S.-Italy FCN on behalf of a U.S. investor whose 
Italian plant had been requisitioned by the Mayor of Palermo and occupied by protesting 
Italian workers); Sumitomo Shoji Am., Inc. v. Avagliano, 457 U.S. 176 (1982) (invoking 
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importantly, the guarantees provided to investors in the FCNs are in 
many cases identical in form and substance to investment-only treaties.124 
It is particularly instructive to compare the main investor-related provi-
sions of the 1959 United States-Pakistan FCN with the Germany-
Pakistan BIT from the same year, as Table 1 does.125 
 
Table 1. FCNs vs. BITs 
 
Subject 1959 U.S.-Pakistan FCN 1959 Germany-Pakistan BIT 
Preamble/Object 
& Purpose 
 
“[E]ncouraging mutually beneficial 
investments, promoting mutually 
advantageous commercial inter-
course and otherwise establishing 
mutual rights and privileges” 
“Desiring to intensify economic co-
operation . . . , Intending to create 
favorable conditions for invest-
ments . . . promot[ing] investment, 
encourage[ing] private industrial 
and financial enterprise” 
General Standard 
of Treatment 
Treatment “no less favorable than 
other enterprises of whatever na-
tionality engaged in similar activi-
ties” (Art. VII); freedom from “un-
reasonable or discriminatory meas-
ures” (Art. VI(3)); “the most con-
stant protection and security” (Art. 
VI(1)) 
“[N]on-discrimination” (Arts. 1(2) 
& 2); “protection and security” 
(Art. 3(1)) 
Expropriation Allowed only for “public purpose” 
and against “prompt payment of 
just compensation” that is “effec-
tively realizable” (Art. VI(4)) 
Allowed only for “public benefit” 
and against “compensation” that is 
“actually realizable” and “equiva-
lent of [sic] the investment af-
fected” (Art. 3(2)) 
                                                                                                             
the U.S.-Japan FCN to challenge the applicability of American anti-discrimination laws 
to Japanese investors). 
 124. See Wayne Sachs, The “New” U.S. Bilateral Investment Treaties, 2 INT’L TAX & 
BUS. LAW. 192 (1984). The article’s title indicates Sachs’ deep skepticism about the nov-
elty of the U.S. effort, which, as Sachs demonstrates convincingly, draws much more 
deeply on the U.S. FCN treaties than most observers acknowledge. Id. 
 125. Treaty for the Protection of Investment, W. Ger.-Pak., Nov. 25, 1959, 457 
U.N.T.S. 23; Treaty of Friendship and Commerce, U.S.-Pak., Nov. 12, 1959, 12 U.S.T. 
110, T.I.A.S. No. 4683. 
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Transfers Freedom to transfer “funds” on 
national treatment or most favored 
nation basis (Art. XII(1)) 
Freedom to transfer “invested capi-
tal, of the returns,” “without undue 
delay” and at “just and reasonable” 
rate of exchange (Arts. 4 & 6) 
Dispute Settle-
ment (State-State 
Only) 
 
 
Disputes between states “as to 
interpretation or application” sub-
ject to compulsory arbitration be-
fore the International Court of Jus-
tice (ICJ) (Art. XXIII(2)) 
Disputes between states as to “in-
terpretation or application” subject 
to compulsory ad hoc international 
arbitration (Art. 11) 
 
 
The similarities are striking and the conclusion is unavoidable—if the 
Germany-Pakistan treaty is a conceptually relevant BIT, then the U.S. 
FCNs must be relevant as well. 
The practical importance of this point will vary according to the par-
ticular analysis. Many post-war FCNs were concluded with what today 
are considered to be well developed countries—Belgium, Denmark, 
Germany, Greece, France, Japan, Italy, Ireland, Luxembourg, and the 
Netherlands126—and are irrelevant if the study at issue is concerned only 
with the causes and consequences of treaties involving developing coun-
tries. The United States and several other capital-exporting states have 
signed BIT-like FCNs with a number of developing countries. Thus, the 
failure of empirical BIT analysts to consider these FCNs as BIT-
equivalent treaties is unjustifiable as long as the Germany-Pakistan BIT 
and others like it are also included in the analysis. Indeed, that 
UNCTAD’s exclusion of the United States-Pakistan FCN (and other 
equivalent post-war FCNs) is entirely arbitrary is best illustrated by the 
fact that UNCTAD’s list of BITs inexplicably includes a number of 
FCN-type commercial treaties concluded by Switzerland and Sweden in 
the years immediately following 1959.127 Why these treaties should be 
included on UNCTAD’s list, but not the United States-Pakistan FCN or 
others like it is difficult to fathom. 
                                                                                                             
 126. See Won-Mog Choi, The Present and Future of the Investor-State Dispute, 10 J. 
INT’L ECON. L. 725, 731 (2007) (“Many of the FCNs, like the FCCRs and earlier com-
mercial agreements, were concluded with developed countries, including Belgium, Den-
mark, Germany, Italy, France, the Netherlands, and Japan.”). 
 127. The Swiss and Swedish FCN-type treaties are listed in the appendix to Yackee, 
supra note 84. 
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How many BIT-like FCNs are at issue here? Not a great number, but 
not an insignificant number either. Table 2 lists the principal candidates 
for four of the most important capital-exporting countries. All of the 
FCN treaties listed below contain something arguably approximating the 
“substantive core” of modern BITs and involve developing countries (or 
countries that might fairly have suffered the name until quite recently). 
 
Table 2. BIT-Like FCNs between Major Capital-Exporting  
Countries and Developing Countries 
 
United States Japan Germany UK 
Ethiopia 
Haiti* 
Israel 
Iran 
Nicaragua* 
Oman 
South Korea 
Taiwan 
Thailand 
Togo 
Vietnam 
Uruguay* 
Colombia* 
Argentina 
Cuba 
El Salvador 
India 
Indonesia 
Malaysia 
Pakistan 
Peru 
Philippines 
Singapore 
 
Dominican Rep.* 
 
Cameroon* 
Iran 
*Never entered into force or no longer appears to be in force 
Source: Jason Webb Yackee, Sacrificing Sovereignty: Bilateral Investment Treaties, Inter-
national Arbitration, and the Quest for Capital (2007) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, 
University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill). 
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Other commercial treaties are worthy of consideration as well. They 
are not included in Table 2 because they emphasize investment-related 
issues to a lesser degree than other FCN treaties. This does not mean, 
however, that they are analytically irrelevant. In particular, Japan entered 
into at least eight commercial treaties with Communist states; the treaties 
ignore investment per se but nonetheless promise MFN treatment with 
respect to the “protection of property and security of business activi-
ties.”128 It is very likely that these MFN provisions operated (and, to the 
extent these treaties remain in force, continue to operate) to fully extend 
many substantive BIT promises to Japanese investors operating in those 
(ex-) Communist states. 
What significance do these largely BIT-equivalent FCNs and similar 
commercial treaties have for empirical studies of the BIT phenomenon? 
Arguably, to the extent that the FCNs fail to provide investors with guar-
anteed access to international arbitration (and all of them do), they 
should not be included in the analysis because they are not properly con-
sidered credible commitment devices of any significant potential. If that 
is indeed a supportable position, then many other early investment-only 
treaties, like the 1959 Germany-Pakistan BIT, should be dropped from 
the analysis as well. 
It should also be emphasized that an analytical focus on investment-
only treaties ignores the modern trend toward embedding significant in-
vestment provisions, including guaranteed investor access to interna-
tional arbitration, within free trade agreements (“FTAs”). NAFTA’s 
Chapter 11 is the most well-known example,129 but a host of other multi-
lateral and bilateral free trade agreements contain similar investment 
chapters. The ASEAN Agreement for the Promotion and Protection of 
Investments130 and the MERCOSUR Colonia Protocol for the Reciprocal 
Promotion and Protection of Investments131 have already been men-
tioned, but there are numerous other examples. Mexico, for instance, has 
signed FTAs containing BIT-equivalent investment chapters with Vene-
                                                                                                             
 128. Matsui, supra note 118, at 3–4. 
 129. NAFTA, supra note 102, ch. 11; William S. Dodge, Investor-State Dispute Set-
tlement Between Developed Countries: Reflections on the Australia-United States Free 
Trade Agreement, 39 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 1, 3 (2006). 
 130. Agreement among the Government of Brunei Darussalam, the Republic of Indo-
nesia, Malaysia, the Republic of the Philippines, the Republic of Singapore, and the 
Kingdom of Thailand for the Promotion and Protection of Investments, supra note 103, 
art. X. 
 131. Colonia Protocol for the Promotion and Reciprocal Protections of Investments in 
MERCOSUR, supra note 104, art. 9. 
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zuela, Colombia, Chile, Nicaragua, Costa Rica, Bolivia, Honduras, El 
Salvador, and Guatemala,132 none of which are found on UNCTAD’s list. 
Finally, commercial treaties, whether of the FCN or FTA type, are not 
the only multi-subject treaty-based source of BIT-like guarantees to in-
vestors. The best example is Protocol One of the European Convention 
for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms 
(“ECHR”), which provides foreign investors with an explicit guarantee 
that they shall not suffer expropriation in violation of the “general prin-
ciples of international law” and legally binds most of Western and East-
ern Europe, as well as Russia and Turkey.133 Other provisions of the 
ECHR and its associated protocols give covered “natural and legal per-
sons” the right to bring enforcement actions against expropriating states 
before the European Court of Human Rights; the European Court of Jus-
tice can also decide investor-state property rights claims arising under 
Protocol One.134 That empirically minded BIT analysts have largely, if 
not wholly, failed to consider the ECHR as a credible commitment de-
vice that affect analysis of the BIT phenomenon is troublesome. One of 
the central achievements of BITs is often said to be the reinforcement of 
customary international law principles of just compensation for expro-
priation.135 The ECHR does just that on a remarkable scale. 
Many other international treaties, and even some non-binding interna-
tional agreements, contain provisions of potential relevance to foreign 
investors. Among these, the WTO’s General Agreement on Trade in Ser-
vices (“GATS”),136 the WTO’s Trade-Related Investment Measures 
                                                                                                             
 132. The Organization of American States (“OAS”) provides a comprehensive list and 
links to the full texts of these and other inter-American trade and investment agreements 
at http://www.sice.oas.org/agreements_e.asp (last visited Apr. 9, 2008). 
 133. See Protocol to the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Funda-
mental Freedoms art.1, Mar. 20, 1952, 213 U.N.T.S. 262 (“Every natural or legal person 
is entitled to the peaceful enjoyment of his possessions. No one shall be deprived of his 
possessions except in the public interest and subject to the conditions provided for by law 
and by the general principles of international law.”). For a discussion of international 
cases brought under this provision, see Jon A. Stanley, Keeping Big Brother Out of Our 
Backyard: Regulatory Takings as Defined in International Law and Compared to Ameri-
can Fifth Amendment Jurisprudence, 15 EMORY INT’L L. REV. 349, 382–85 (2001). 
 134. See Been & Beauvais, supra note 3, at 56. 
 135. This seems to be Guzman’s view, for instance. See generally Guzman, supra note 
13. 
 136. General Agreement on Trade in Services, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement 
Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1B, Legal Instruments, reprinted in 
THE LEGAL TEXTS—THE RESULTS OF THE URUGUAY ROUND OF MULTILATERAL TRADE 
NEGOTIATIONS 284 (1999). The GATS “covers FDI in services by defining trade in ser-
vices as encompassing the supply of a service through the establishment of a ‘commercial 
presence’ in the territory of another GATS signatory” and imposes requirements of na-
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(“TRIMS”) agreement,137 the Treaty Establishing the European Commu-
nity,138 and the OECD’s various declarations and codes on foreign in-
vestment139 stand out, but there are many others of greater or lesser con-
ceptual relevance, and of greater or lesser facial resemblance to the typi-
cal BIT. Of significant potential importance are the various partnership 
and cooperation agreements (“PCAs”) that states wishing to accede to 
the European Union are required to sign and that typically contain provi-
sions promising foreign investors certain rights of establishment, non-
discriminatory treatment, and freedom to transfer capital, as well as hor-
tatory calls to promote FDI and to improve the investment climate, and 
so on—all very BIT-like promises.140 
Whether all or any of these various non-BIT instruments should neces-
sarily be included as BIT equivalents in all studies is an open question. 
Nonetheless, analysts should consider in a much more careful and theo-
                                                                                                             
tional and MFN treatment. Eric M. Burt, Note and Comment, Developing Countries and 
the Framework for Negotiations on Foreign Direct Investment in the World Trade Or-
ganization, 12 AM. U. J. INT’L L. & POL’Y 1015, 1030–32 (1997) (citations omitted). 
 137. Agreement on Trade-Related Investment Measures, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh 
Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1A, Legal Instruments, 
reprinted in THE LEGAL TEXTS—THE RESULTS OF THE URUGUAY ROUND OF 
MULTILATERAL TRADE NEGOTIATIONS 143 (1999). TRIMS ban “any host country invest-
ment restriction that directly affects trade flows.” Burt, supra note 136, at 1034. 
 138. Consolidated Version of the Treaty Establishing the European Community arts. 
48–73, Dec. 24, 2002, 2002 O.J. (C 325/1) (establishing the free movement of people, 
services, and capital between European Union member states). 
 139. The OECD Declaration and Decisions on International Investment and Multina-
tional Enterprises commits adhering states to providing national treatment to each other’s 
foreign investors. See OECD Declaration and Decisions on International Investment  
and Multinational Enterprises (2000), http://www.olis.oecd.org/olis/2000doc.nsf/ 
LinkTo/NT00002BE6/$FILE/00085743.PDF. Mexico, Korea, the Czech and Slovak 
Republics, Poland, Hungary, and Turkey, all members of the OECD, have signed on,  
as have a number of non-OECD developing countries, including Argentina, Brazil,  
and Chile. Id. OECD members have also adhered to codes of Liberalisation of  
Capital Movements and Liberalisation of Current Invisible Operations. See OECD  
Codes of Liberalisation of Capital Movements and of Current Invisible Operations, 
http://www.oecd.org/document/63/0,2340,en_2649_34887_1826559_1_1_1_1,00.html 
(last visited Jan. 26, 2008). The codes “constitute legally binding rules, stipulating pro-
gressive, non-discriminatory liberalisation of capital movements, the right of establish-
ment and current invisible transactions (mostly services).” Id. Compliance is encouraged 
through what the OECD calls “peer pressure exercised through policy reviews and coun-
try examinations to encourage unilateral rather than negotiated liberalization.” Id. 
 140. See, e.g., Partnership and Cooperation Agreement between the European Com-
munities and their Member States and the Republic of Moldova, arts. 29, 31(d), 47(2) & 
47(4), Nov. 28, 1994, 1998 O.J. (L 181) 3 (non-discriminatory treatment in article 29, 
establishment rights in article 31(d), free transfer of capital in article 47(2), and calls to 
improve FDI and investment climate in article 47(4)). 
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retically self-conscious manner the extent to which such instruments 
might make BIT commitments redundant or unnecessary as credible 
commitment devices.141 For example, a PCA with the European Union, 
combined with the property protection provisions of the ECHR, comes 
perilously close to providing exactly the same guarantees as partial pre-
consent BITs. It is exceedingly hard to justify reliance on the latter trea-
ties as theoretically meaningful but not the former. 
C. The Need to Consider Non-Treaty Means of Credible Commitment 
The need to consider non-treaty means of credible commitment pre-
sents the greatest challenge to empirical studies of BITs. The problem is 
one of identifying the proper comparison. Most BIT analysts seem to 
presume that the relevant comparison is between going out in the world 
well protected—i.e., protected by a BIT—or not protected at all. This 
presumption is particularly evident in Guzman’s elaboration of his cartel 
theory of the reasons why LDCs sign BITs that hurt them.142 As pre-
sumptions go, this one is particularly unfounded; the reason why bears 
repeating: other kinds of treaties—multilateral rather than bilateral, 
commercial rather than investment-only—may contain provisions largely 
equivalent to those traditionally provided in BITs. Furthermore, as will 
be explored below, states may provide BIT-like guarantees of both a sub-
stantive and procedural nature through formal non-treaty instruments 
such as municipal law and individual investment contracts. These treaty 
alternatives also have strong potential to function as substitute credible 
commitment devices. 
1. Municipal Law 
Recall that BITs perform two logically separate functions—they are 
devices through which host states extend favorable substantive promises 
and through which host states make those promises credible. Non-
specialists might assume that a host state’s decision to enter a BIT is a 
decision to significantly liberalize FDI policy—that is, that signing and 
ratifying a BIT extends to investors significantly more favorable substan-
tive promises than were offered absent the BIT. With the potential excep-
                                                                                                             
 141. In some instances the acceptance of an international institutional alternative to 
BITs may legally preclude a host state from also securing an investment treaty. For ex-
ample, French law prohibits the French government from signing BITs with African 
states that have the CFA currency. See Patrick Juillard, Les conventions bilatérales 
d’investissement conclues par la France [Bilateral Investment Conventions Concluded by 
France], 106 J. DROIT INT’L 274, 282–83 (1979) (Fr.). 
 142. See Guzman, supra note 13, at 644. 
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tion of U.S. BITs, which have long required national treatment at the pre-
investment stage,143 this is simply not the case. Most BITs do not require 
host states to accept more investment, nor do most BITs prevent host 
states from imposing burdensome performance requirements on investors 
as a condition of entry. Instead, the liberality of a host state’s FDI regime 
is primarily determined by promises extended to investors through mu-
nicipal law. For example, municipal law may define which sectors of the 
economy are open to foreign investment and on what particular terms—it 
can determine tax rates, the availability of investment incentives, and 
conditions of operation.144 The bulk of what matters legally to foreign 
investors is supplied by municipal law; indeed, this is unavoidable be-
cause BITs, as brief and general statements of the law applicable to in-
vestments of all types, are unable to provide investors or host states with 
a sufficiently detailed and self-contained legal regime. It is unsurprising 
that for much of recent history investment framework laws have been the 
primary means of promoting and controlling foreign investment in the 
developing world.145 
Municipal law is thus a necessary complement to BITs. However, mu-
nicipal law may also provide the same substantive guarantees as BITs, 
and it can do so much more broadly. For example, domestic laws often 
contain fairly favorable rules concerning compensation for expropriation 
generally.146 Domestic laws may also specify that foreign investors in 
most sectors shall enjoy “national treatment.”147 Over the past decade 
host states have also used domestic law to greatly liberalize their capital 
                                                                                                             
 143. See Patricia McKinstry Robin, Comment, The BIT Won’t Bite: The American 
Bilateral Investment Treaty Program, 33 AM. U. L. REV. 931, 947 (1984) (discussing 
Article II of the official U.S. “prototype” BIT, which “provides that signatory countries 
will accord national treatment to the admission or establishment of investments”). Robin 
notes that this aspect of the U.S. BIT program was one of the more “controversial.” Id. 
 144. See UNCTAD, TRENDS IN INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT AGREEMENTS: AN 
OVERVIEW, supra note 2, at 35–38. 
 145. See A.A. Fatouros, The Quest for Legal Security of Foreign Investments—Latest 
Developments, 17 RUTGERS L. REV. 257, 268–69 (1963) (discussing the “great number of 
statutes relating to the regulation and encouragement of foreign investments” that came 
into effect in the developing world in the early 1960s). 
 146. The most obvious example is Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution, 
which provides that “nor shall private property be taken for public use, without just com-
pensation.” U.S. CONST. amend V. For a detailed and useful (if dated) comparative ex-
amination of domestic expropriation regimes in the Americas, see EXPROPRIATION IN THE 
AMERICAS: A COMPARATIVE LAW STUDY (Andreas F. Lowenfeld ed., 1971). 
 147. See, e.g., Republic of Mozambique, Assembly of the Republic, Law No. 3/93, art. 
4 (June 24, 1993), reprinted in INVESTMENT LAWS OF THE WORLD, at Binder VI (Int’l 
Center for Settlement of Inv. Disputes ed., Oceana Publications 2002) (providing that 
“foreign investors . . . will enjoy the same rights . . . applicable to nationals”). 
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accounts, allowing foreign investors much greater freedom to repatriate 
assets and income.148 And unlike BITs, which provide their guarantees 
only to investors from a single home state, municipal law guarantees are 
extended to investors from the world over. 
From the investor’s perspective, the main problem with municipal law 
is the relative ease with which the host state may be able to change the 
laws in adverse ways. Presumably, BITs serve to reduce state incentives 
to change municipal law in ways unfavorable to the foreign investor by 
providing causes of action for regulatory takings and the like. Nonethe-
less, the potential utility of BITs in this regard does not mean that favor-
able municipal law promises may not be made sufficiently credible by 
other means. 
On the one hand, municipal law itself may make changes in the law 
difficult to achieve. This is particularly the case where, for instance, 
guarantees of compensation for expropriation are embedded in the na-
tional constitution, as they have been in most Latin American countries 
for some time.149 A more unusual example is provided by Greece, which 
in the past has used a special legal procedure to grant investment-related 
laws special quasi-constitutional status that constrains the government’s 
ability to amend the laws absent a constitutional amendment.150 On the 
other hand, host states may use municipal law to explicitly promise in-
vestors that the relevant legal regimes will remain stable as to their cur-
rent investments. Article 9 of Russia’s 1999 Federal Law on Foreign In-
vestment, which bears the unwieldy title of “Guarantees to Foreign In-
vestors and Companies with Foreign Investment Against Unfavorable 
Changes in the Legislation of the Russian Federation,” is one example.151 
There is, of course, no magical power of commitment in a host state’s 
unilateral legislative declarations that foreign investors are welcome on 
such and such terms. A state that greatly values change in the status quo 
is unlikely to be dissuaded from vigorously pursuing such change, even 
if municipal law inconveniently stands in the way. That said, it is reason-
able to presume that a state that has explicitly and publicly made pro-
                                                                                                             
 148. See generally Elizabeth Asiedu & Donald Lien, Capital Controls and Foreign 
Direct Investment, 32 WORLD DEV. 47 (2003). 
 149. See generally EXPROPRIATION IN THE AMERICAS: A COMPARATIVE LAW STUDY, 
supra note 46, at 313 (noting that each of the seven Latin American countries studied 
“has a written constitution which speaks expressly to the subject of expropriation”). 
 150. This aspect of the Greek investment law is discussed in A.A. FATOUROS, 
GOVERNMENT GUARANTEES TO FOREIGN INVESTORS 121 n.208 (1962). 
 151. See The Russian Federation Federal Law on Foreign Investment in the Russian 
Federation, art. 9, July 2, 1999, reprinted in INVESTMENT LAWS OF THE WORLD, at Binder 
VII (Int’l Center for Settlement of Inv. Disputes ed., Oceana Publications 2002). 
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investor promises in an investment law may be more likely to think twice 
about adversely changing the regulatory regime than one that has not, 
even absent a binding commitment to international arbitration. In other 
words, reputation has a potentially meaningful role to play here, espe-
cially if breaches of municipal law promises, because of their relative 
clarity of meaning and application, are more easily detectable than 
breaches of vague treaty law. But regardless of the role that reputation 
might play in naturally stabilizing certain kinds of favorable municipal 
law promises, host states may also use municipal law to provide inves-
tors with guaranteed access to international arbitration, where claims of 
unfair changes in the substantive domestic legal regime (or other claims) 
can be litigated. Greece appears to have been one of the first states to 
embed a promise to arbitrate in its municipal foreign investment laws,152 
but it is certainly not the only example. Fatourous’s excellent 1963 sur-
vey of investment guarantees found that states anxious to develop their 
petroleum resources were especially likely to provide for international 
arbitration of investment disputes through domestic laws.153 A more re-
cent survey has found that approximately twenty national foreign in-
vestment laws include generic consent provisions to arbitrate disputes 
with foreign investors under the ICSID Convention.154 These municipal 
law pre-consents even occasionally produce published arbitral awards.155 
                                                                                                             
 152. FATOUROS, supra note 150, at 186. 
 153. Id. at 187 (discussing municipal law-based promises to arbitrate disputes related 
to investments in the petroleum sector in India, Pakistan, Greece, Libya, Morocco, Iran, 
and Mali). 
 154. See Lovells, Protecting Investments Overseas: Bilateral Investment Treaties, 
Foreign Investment Laws and ICSID Arbitration, at 2, Aug. 1, 2006, 
http://www.lovells.com/NR/rdonlyres/4D91D0A5-8303-4844-8D978DB8F7A2C94F/86 
34/4152_D4.pdf; Ibrahim F.I. Shihata & Antonio Parra, The Experience of the Interna-
tional Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes, 14 ICSID REV. FOREIGN INVEST. L.J. 
299, 303 (1999). However, this count excludes investment laws that contain state prom-
ises or pre-consents to non-ICSID arbitration; thus it is not a complete picture of the 
prevalence of arbitration for these disputes. For example, Ghana’s 1994 Investment Act 
and 1986 Minerals and Mining Law both “provide for arbitration when disputes cannot 
be settled by other means.” See Investment Act, 1994, § 29(2) (Ghana); Minerals & Min-
ing Law, 1986, § 8(3) (Ghana). Additionally, municipal law pre-consents have occasion-
ally produced published arbitral awards. See, e.g., Southern Pacific Properties (Middle 
East) v. Arab Republic of Egypt, Decision on Jurisdiction, 3 ICSID Rep. 142/3 (Apr. 14, 
1988); Tradex Hellas S.A. (Greece) v. Albania, 14 ICSID REV. FOREIGN INV. L.J. 161, 
165 (1996). 
 155. See, e.g., Southern Pacific Properties Ltd. v. Arab Republic of Egypt, ICSID Case 
No. ARB/84/3, Decision on Jurisdiction, 3 ICSID (W. Bank) 131, ¶¶ 72–75 (Apr. 14, 
1988). A Canadian mining company has recently initiated arbitration against the Kazakh 
government under that country’s foreign investment law. See Luke Eric Peterson, Cana-
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This ability to use municipal law to provide investors with effective pre-
consents to binding international arbitration is what makes municipal law 
a plausible BIT substitute. 
2. Investment Contracts 
Municipal law is not the only plausible BIT substitute. Foreign inves-
tors, unlike private parties engaged in international trade, are often 
placed in the position of explicitly bargaining with host states over the 
terms under which they will be allowed to establish their investment and 
to continue operations.156 This is especially so in the natural resources 
sector,157 in which the host state usually owns the natural resources to be 
extracted, and in the public utilities or infrastructure sectors,158 where the 
investor is called upon to provide an essential public service like electric-
ity or a highway. It is also true of the manufacturing sector, where the 
foreign investor is typically required to contract with the host state in 
order to receive special treatment like tax incentives or the right to oper-
ate in an export processing zone (“EPZ”).159 
Many early investment framework laws explicitly envisioned that for-
eign investment would need to be approved by the host state in order to 
                                                                                                             
dian Uranium Miner Sues Kazakhstan under Foreign Investment Law, INV. TREATY 
NEWS, July 12, 2007, available at http://www.iisd.org/investment/itn/archive.asp. 
 156. In the typical international sales transaction, the relationship is an arms-length one 
between private parties that, individually speaking, have “minimum impacts upon the 
policy or other interests of the states with which the transaction would come into contact. 
It is not an intrusive transaction in that very little conduct relating to it takes place in 
either country and the duration of the course of that transaction is short.” M. 
SORNARAJAH, THE SETTLEMENT OF FOREIGN INVESTMENT DISPUTES 228 (2000). Thus, the 
importing state typically has little incentive to invest in costly contracting with individual 
traders as to the importing state’s obligations in regard to that particular trade, and is 
content to set trade policy on the national level while granting the private parties to the 
trade transaction relatively complete autonomy to structure their deal in the way the par-
ties see fit. See id. The one principal exception to this rule was the socialist states’ state 
trading entities practice of including arbitration agreements in their international trade 
contracts. See HENRY CATTAN, THE LAW OF OIL CONCESSIONS IN THE MIDDLE EAST AND 
NORTH AFRICA 142 n.8 (1967). 
 157. Burnett, supra note 119, at 237. For an in-depth discussion of natural resources 
investment contracts, see generally DAVID N. SMITH & LOUIS T. WELLS, JR., NEGOTIATING 
THIRD-WORLD MINERAL AGREEMENTS: PROMISES AS PROLOGUE (1975); ERNEST E. SMITH 
ET AL., INTERNATIONAL PETROLEUM TRANSACTIONS (2d ed. 2000). 
 158. See generally J. LUIS GUASCH, GRANTING AND RENEGOTIATING INFRASTRUCTURE 
CONCESSIONS: DOING IT RIGHT (2004). 
 159. See MUCHLINSKI, supra note 46, at 230–33; David Wall, Export Processing 
Zones, 10 J. WORLD TRADE L. 478, 479 (1976). 
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receive certain legal protections or policy concessions.160 Even today, 
some states still require government approval of investments in order to 
obtain BIT benefits.161 The approval process does not necessarily entail a 
contract, but the approval process does give the investor an informal op-
portunity to ask for a formal agreement. Latin American states in particu-
lar have preferred historically to grant rights to foreign investors directly 
through bargaining, rather than indirectly through treaties with the inves-
tors’ home states.162 Some of those states still seek to encourage investor-
state contracting by making access to favorable guarantees and benefits 
contingent upon it.163 Home states have also long encouraged investors to 
contract directly with host states. For example, investors will often be 
legally precluded from accessing the home state’s government sponsored 
investment insurance absent the host state’s formal approval of the in-
vestment.164 Some home state investment insurance programs may even 
require an actual investment agreement.165 
                                                                                                             
 160. See, e.g., Foreign Investments Protection Act, (1964) Cap. 35 § 3(1) (Kenya), 
reprinted in 4 INT’L LEGAL MATERIALS 241 (1965). 
 161. See, e.g., Agreement on the Promotion and Protection of Investments, Sing.-Sri 
Lanka, art. 2, May 9, 1980, 1202 U.N.T.S. 333 (requiring “approval in writing” by gov-
ernment officials). Sornarajah notes that “most” East Asian BITs limit their protections to 
officially approved investments. SORNARAJAH, supra note 6, at 266. 
 162. As Tawil explains: 
En general, los países de la región [of Latin America], han preferido la nego-
ciación directa, con los inversiones, aduciendo, que tales tratados con los países 
industrializados no resultan equilibrados, obligándolos a asumir costosos com-
promisos a largo plazo, sin imponer responsabilidades similares a sus cocontra-
tantes. 
Guido Santiago Tawil, La crisis latinoamericana y algunas perspectives de cambio en la 
regulación de las inversions extranjeras en la regíon [The Latin American Crisis and 
Some Perspectives on Regulatory Change of Foreign Investors in the Region], LA LEY 
1988-A, 871 n.17. 
 163. Peru, for instance, gives investors who enter an investment contract with the state 
the right to benefit from a special legal regime guaranteeing “legal stability” as to tax, 
currency repatriation, and national-treatment laws for ten years from the date of contract 
execution. See Decreto Legislativo No. 662 Aprueba Régimen de Estabilidad Jurídica a la 
Inversion Extranjera, Titulo II [Legislative Decree No. 662 Aprueba Regime of Foreign 
Investment Legal Stability] (1991) (Peru). The availability of the “stability regime” de-
pends on the investor’s willingness to contractually undertake certain obligations relating 
to the size of the investment and its employment and export effects. 
 164. See THEODOR MERON, INVESTMENT INSURANCE AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 62, 126 
(1976) (noting the requirement for host-state approval in regard to the U.S. and Canadian 
investment insurance programs). 
 165. France, for example, has conditioned availability of its insurance on a host state’s 
willingness to enter a “specific engagement” with the investor, which must contain the 
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The opportunity to bargain is important because it provides the foreign 
investor with the occasion to induce the host state to clarify the terms of 
the investor’s entry and operation or to improve upon the promises of-
fered under municipal or international law through an investment con-
tract (often called an investment agreement). For example, host states 
may enact relatively unfavorable national investment laws, which are 
intended only as a prelude to the possibility of more favorable treatment 
extended on a project-by-project basis. In this case, municipal law repre-
sents the first stage in a bargaining process between the host state and the 
foreign investor. This appears to have been the case for the members of 
the Andean Common Market in the 1970s, which largely for domestic 
political reasons adopted an outwardly hostile policy toward foreign in-
vestors, but was willing to grant foreign investors much more favorable 
terms of entry and operation on an ad hoc basis.166 
Early contracts between host states and investors tended to be “rather 
simple documents,”167 but these contracts have become significantly 
more detailed and complex over time.168 Importantly, foreign investment 
contracts are not a phenomenon limited to the infrastructure or natural 
resources sectors. For example, Intel’s practice when deciding whether to 
construct new semi-conductor manufacturing facilities is to enter into 
intensive haggling with potential host states over a variety of fine-
grained matters and to insist that any resulting deal be committed to a 
written contract prior to any investment.169 
                                                                                                             
host state’s consent to ICSID arbitration. See, e.g., Convention on the Protection of In-
vestments, Fr.-Tunis., art. 2, June 30, 1972, 848 U.N.T.S. 143. 
 166. See generally FRANCOIS J. LOMBARD, THE FOREIGN INVESTMENT SCREENING 
PROCESS IN LDCS: THE CASE OF COLOMBIA, 1967–1975 (1979). As Lombard concludes, 
“foreign investors have to be aware that behind the strict rules there exist possible ways 
to reach operational agreements.” Id. at 126. This situation has been described as one of 
“carrot and stick” whereby “[i]n essence, a bargaining process is created; both sides 
probe for maximum advantage until a deal acceptable to both is struck.” U.S. Policy To-
ward International Investment: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on International Eco-
nomic Policy of the S. Comm. on Foreign Relations, 97th Cong. 14 (1981) (prepared 
statement of C. Fred Bergsten, Senior Associate, Carnegie Endowment for International 
Peace). 
 167. SMITH & WELLS, supra note 157, at 31. 
 168. Id. at 37–53. For example, in a recent, prominent international arbitration,  
the water services concession contract at issue was 111 single-spaced pages, “consisting 
of 16 articles plus 25 lengthy appendices” and was the product of two years  
of negotiation. Compañía de Aguas del Aconquija, S.A. v. Argentine Republic,  
ICSID Case No. ARB 97/3, 16 ICSID (W. Bank) 141, ¶¶ 25–26, available at 
http://www.worldbank.org/icsid/cases/ada_AwardoftheTribunal.pdf. 
 169. Debora Spar, Attracting High Technology Investment: Intel’s Costa Rican Plant, 
FOREIGN INVESTMENT ADVISORY SERVICE 10–11 (1998). 
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Unsurprisingly, investment agreements between foreign investors and 
host states often contain the state’s pre-consent to international arbitra-
tion. Investment framework laws sometimes expressly provide that in-
vestment contracts shall contain arbitration clauses,170 and the home 
state’s investment guarantee treaties may require arbitration clauses in 
investment contracts as a condition for insuring the project.171 French 
BITs have also required host states to promise to insert arbitration claus-
es into investment contracts upon the investor’s request.172 In other cases 
the investor may succeed in convincing the host state to agree to con-
tract-based arbitration even in the absence of any legal requirement to do 
so.173 Even Latin American states, which have long required investors to 
submit to the exclusive jurisdiction of municipal courts, appear to have 
relaxed their attachment to that particular contractual term.174 
From the investor’s perspective, the effect of contract-based arbitration 
agreements is substantively identical to that of BIT-based arbitration 
agreements. For example, nothing prevents an investment contract from 
providing the investor with guaranteed access to ICSID; indeed, ICSID 
                                                                                                             
 170. Landau notes that the early investment framework laws of a number of African 
countries required or provided for the possibility of arbitration in “establishment agree-
ments” (investment contracts) with foreign investors. Henry Landau, Direct Foreign 
Investments in Developing Countries, 4 J. L. & ECON. DEV. 182, 199 n.48 (1969). 
 171. See Convention on the Protection of Investments, Fr.-Tunis., supra note 165. 
 172. See e.g., Agreement between the French Republic and the Republic of Indonesia 
on the Encouragement and Protection of French Investments in Indonesia, Fr.-Indon., art. 
8, June 14, 1973, 985 U.N.T.S. 258. 
 173. From the perspective of the petroleum-sector investor, “recourse to national 
courts is unthinkable and unrealistic [irréalisable],” making arbitration clauses a funda-
mental necessity in the contracts. Jacques Logie, Les Contrats Pétroliers Iraniens, 1 
REVUE BELGE DROIT INT’L 392, 410 (1965). For an early discussion of the use of invest-
ment contracts in contract-based economic development agreements between multina-
tional corporations and developing states, see Maurice Bourquin, Arbitration and Eco-
nomic Development Agreements, in SELECTED READINGS ON PROTECTION BY LAW OF 
PRIVATE FOREIGN INVESTMENTS 99 (Fred B. Rothman & Co. 1973) (1964). Bourquin 
claims that “[a]rbitration is generally included” in these agreements and provides several 
examples. Id. at 109. Alfred Verdross makes a similar argument. See Alfred Verdross, 
The Status of Foreign Private Interests Stemming from Economic Development Agree-
ments with Arbitration Clauses, in SELECTED READINGS ON PROTECTION BY LAW OF 
PRIVATE FOREIGN INVESTMENTS 117, 137 (Fred B. Rothman & Co. 1973) (1964). Fa-
touros suggests that by the early 1960s, investor-state arbitration clauses were “frequently 
included in agreements between states and foreign nationals or companies . . . usually 
describ[ing] in detail the procedures to be followed in case of dispute.” FATOUROS, supra 
note 150, at 187. 
 174. See generally Denise Manning-Cabrol, The Imminent Death of the Calvo Clause 
and the Rebirth of the Calvo Principle: Equality of Foreign and National Investors, 26 
LAW & POL’Y INT’L BUS. 1169 (1995). 
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arbitration clauses appear to be a relatively common feature of modern 
investment contracts.175 And an ICSID award rendered under a contract-
based agreement has the same force worldwide as an award rendered 
under an investment treaty because the ICSID Convention’s recognition 
and enforcement provisions do not distinguish between treaty-based and 
contract-based arbitration (nor any of the Convention’s other provi-
sions).176 Contract-based arbitration and contract-based substantive guar-
antees more generally, are not simply poor cousins to BIT-based guaran-
tees. Putting aside the fact that the substantive guarantees contained in an 
investment contract will most likely not be identical to the substantive 
guarantees of “fair and equitable treatment” and the like in a BIT,177 in-
vestment contracts that include arbitration agreements are fully effective 
substitutes for strong BITs. 
Investment contracts may even be preferred by investors, not because 
contract-based arbitration itself is superior (though the investor may wish 
to have access to a particular arbitral forum not provided for in the rele-
vant BIT), but because the investment contract provides the investor with 
the opportunity to spell out his rights and obligations vis-à-vis the state 
with far greater precision and completeness than the rights and obliga-
tions contained in the typical BIT, the latter of which represents a one-
size-fits-all solution that is unlikely to ideally suit all investors.178 For 
example, investors are often particularly anxious to receive the host 
state’s explicit guarantee of “stabilization,” whereby the host state guar-
antees that the legal or regulatory regime will not change in ways adverse 
                                                                                                             
 175. Schreuer maintains that an agreement between the host state and investor “re-
corded in a single instrument,” e.g., an investment contract, “is the most common form of 
consent.” SCHREUER, supra note 64, at 194. After the Convention’s entry into force, 
“[p]rovisions referring to arbitration under the ICSID Convention quickly became a stan-
dard feature of international investment contracts.” Ibrahim F.I. Shjihata, Foreword to 
SCHREUER, supra note 64, at xv. 
 176.  See ICSID Convention, supra note 4, arts. 53–55. 
 177. Although nothing prevents an investor and host state from providing BIT-like 
substantive guarantees in an investment contract per se. For example, it is perfectly con-
ceivable that the parties to a BIT might subject the contract to international law as such or 
might include provisions dealing with the amount of compensation due if the host state 
expropriated the investor’s property. For an example of a reference to international law in 
an oil concession contract, see Robert B. von Mehren & P. Nicholas Kourides, Interna-
tional Arbitrations between States and Foreign Private Parties: The Libyan Nationaliza-
tion Cases, 75 AM. J. INT’L L. 476, 481–82 (1981). 
 178. As West argues, “The critical focal point in political risk assessment and man-
agement should be the [foreign] investor and the specific [foreign] investment. . . . [T]he 
objectives and uniqueness of each individual investor should largely determine how one 
assesses risk and seeks to manage it.” Gerald T. West, Managing Project Political Risk: 
The Role of Investment Insurance, J. PROJECT FINANCE, Winter 1996, 5, at 6. 
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to the investor’s interests.179 Likewise, the international lenders that fi-
nance the largest and riskiest foreign investment projects often demand 
that investors secure such a guarantee as a condition to funding the in-
vestment project.180 Because BITs do not contain the equivalent of stabi-
lization clauses, investors desiring or requiring them will necessarily 
have to enter into an investment agreement of some sort with the host 
state.181 
In sum, the continuing relevance of investment contracts matters for 
BIT analysts for much the same reason that municipal law matters—it 
suggests that the presence or absence of a BIT, by itself, is an insufficient 
measure of the extent to which a host state has extended credible and 
favorable promises to investors. 
CONCLUDING OBSERVATIONS 
This Article has made two modest but important points. The first is that 
all BITs are not created equal and analysts need to do a much better job 
of sorting wheat from chaff. UNCTAD’s list of BITs, relied on by many, 
is inappropriate for most empirical studies of the BIT phenomenon. To 
the extent that empirical BIT analysts are interested in BITs as poten-
tially effective law-based credible commitment devices, any analysis that 
relies on BITs that lack an enforcement mechanism, especially access to 
international arbitration, is over-inclusive. An example of this is found in 
UNCTAD’s list of BITs, which includes a large number of treaties that 
offer investors no access or incomplete access to effective dispute set-
tlement procedures. 
Second, I have argued that host states have long had access to alterna-
tive credible commitment devices—particularly municipal law and in-
vestment contracts—that can serve the same essential credible commit-
ment functions as BITs. They may even better serve those functions, and 
in this regard investment contracts in particular stand out. Analysts also 
must be sensitive to other international treaties and agreements, such as 
the Energy Charter Treaty, the European Convention on Human Rights, 
or association agreements with the European Union, that either singly or 
in combination offer BIT-equivalent guarantees. 
                                                                                                             
 179. See generally Thomas W. Waelde & George Ndi, Stabilizing International In-
vestment Commitments: International Law Versus Contract Interpretation, 31 TEX. INT’L 
L.J. 215 (1996). 
 180. Id. at 229. 
 181. See generally id. While most BITs do provide guarantees against uncompensated 
expropriation, such guarantees are not as broad and thus not as valuable to the investor as 
typical stabilization guarantees. 
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The principal implication is that empirically minded BIT analysts 
should take considerably more care to properly define their main theo-
retical concept of interest and to ensure that their quantitative measures 
of the phenomenon adequately match the definition. BIT analysts are 
typically not interested in BITs because UNCTAD has listed a particular 
treaty as a BIT—they are interested in BITs as a measure of the degree to 
which a particular host state has used formal legal means to attempt to 
credibly commit to treat investors favorably. Merely quantifying a host 
state’s UNCTAD-listed BITs as some sort of index of host state credible 
commitment, as Neumayer and Spess182 and others do, is inadequate. 
This Article has not, however, demonstrated as an empirical matter that 
the correlations identified by existing analyses of the causes and effects 
of BITs would disappear if those analyses more properly took into ac-
count important differences in BIT design and the use of BIT substitutes. 
In lieu of such a demonstration, which entails a larger research agenda 
than can be presented here,183 there are two paths of research that would 
be worth pursuing. 
First, studies of the effects of BITs on foreign investment flows need to 
focus more explicitly on disentangling the causal effects of BITs—if 
any—from the causal effects of changes in host state foreign investment 
policy that may have coincided simultaneously with the decision to enter 
into BITs. Over the past fifteen years, many host states have dramatically 
modernized and liberalized their foreign investment laws—opening up 
new sectors to foreign involvement (often by privatizing state-owned 
enterprises and contracting out basic governmental services),184 relaxing 
joint venture requirements, eliminating investment screening boards and 
performance requirements, establishing investment promotion agencies 
and EPZs,185 and so on. It is undeniable that investors have attached con-
                                                                                                             
 182. See supra notes 8–10. 
 183. For an initial attempt to advance that agenda, see generally Yackee, supra note 
84. 
 184. On trends in privatization, see Sunita Kikeri & Aishetu Fatima Kolo, Privatiza-
tion: Trends and Recent Developments 1–31 (World Bank, Policy Research Working 
Paper Series No. 3765, 2005). 
 185. The World Bank characterizes EPZs as a “major mechanism used to attract  
[export-oriented manufacturing] FDI” that “proved to be a popular way to attract  
FDI because they enabled foreign investors to reduce production costs, specifically  
their labor costs.” MIGA’s FDI Promotion Center: Resources For Investment  
Promotion Practitioners, Lessons Learned About National FDI Policies, 
www.fdipromotion.com/toolkit/user/content_page.cfm (Section 2.4, Lessons Learned 
About National FDI Policies) (last visited Mar. 5, 2008). EPZs essentially function as 
policy enclaves that provide export-oriented manufacturing investors willing to locate 
within the zones and to engage in desired activities with favorable treatment (primarily 
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siderable value to these changes when they have taken place.186 For in-
stance, in 1993 Mexico enacted an ambitious new Foreign Investment 
Law187—a “crown jewel” achievement representing an unprecedented 
“repudiation” of Mexico’s historically ambivalent and often hostile poli-
cies toward foreign investors.188 At virtually the same time, Mexico 
bound itself to chapter 11 of NAFTA, the free trade agreement’s invest-
ment chapter, and joined the OECD and its international investment in-
struments.189 Which policy change was responsible for the resulting in-
crease in Mexico’s foreign investment inflows? Would U.S. investors 
have flocked to Mexico absent NAFTA but with the protections and 
guarantees of the 1993 law? Are the contemporaneous OECD commit-
ments safely ignored? There is some indication that Mexican authorities 
viewed NAFTA chapter 11 and the 1993 domestic legal changes as 
largely substitutable because NAFTA chapter 11 was largely redundant 
with what Mexico had already done unilaterally.190 
                                                                                                             
tax breaks and relaxed administrative requirements) that is unavailable to foreign inves-
tors more generally. See MUCHLINSKI, supra note 46, at 228–38; Wall, supra note 159, at 
479–80. 
 186. A headline in the Wall Street Journal heralding changes in Brazil’s constitution 
illustrates the point: Multinational Miners Really Dig Brazil—Catalyst is the Easing of 
Curbs on Foreign Ownership. Matt Moffett, Multinational Miners Really Dig Brazil—
Catalyst is the Easing of Curbs on Foreign Ownership, WALL ST. J., Jan. 22, 1997, at 
A10. 
 187. Ley de Inversión Extranjera [L.I.E.] [Foreign Investment Law], as amended, Di-
ario Official de la Federación [D.O.], Dec. 27, 1993 (Mex.). 
 188. Ewell E. Murphy, Jr., Access and Protection for Foreign Investment in Mexico 
under Mexico’s New Foreign Investment Law and the North American Free Trade 
Agreement, 10 ICSID REV. FOREIGN INVEST. L.J. 54, 58 (1995). 
 189. See Paula S. Gibbs, Comment, Prospects for Sustainable Liberalization of For-
eign Investment Laws as a Concomitant of Hemispheric Integration in the Americas, 28 
U. MIAMI INTER-AM. L. REV. 95, 107 n.58 (1996). Gibbs observes:  
Mexico became a member of the Organisation of Economic Cooperation and 
Development (OECD) and adhered to the OECD’s Code of Liberalisation of 
Capital Movements on May 18, 1994. As a new member of the OECD, Mexico 
committed to work toward eliminating all capital controls still preserved in the 
same sectoral exemptions and restrictions on inward direct investment as in 
Chapter Eleven of the NAFTA. 
Id. 
 190. Mexico accepted chapter 11 and NAFTA more generally because it “desire[d] to 
implement a radical agenda of economic restructuring within Mexico. NAFTA was the 
cornerstone of this policy, and many of the measures that Mexico was called on to take in 
the NAFTA were ones that Mexican leaders had already decided to undertake anyway.” 
MAXWELL A. CAMERON & BRIAN W. TOMLIN, THE MAKING OF NAFTA: HOW THE DEAL 
WAS DONE 123 (2000). Additionally, 
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One solution to the problem of multiple causation, and probably the 
best one, is to eschew the use of multivariate regression for the decidedly 
less sexy but potentially far more appropriate methodologies of case 
study and survey. In other words, if the hypothesis is that foreign inves-
tors really care about BITs and that BITs meaningfully influence their 
decisions, why not ask them if this is indeed the case? We currently have 
little real sense of what actual role, if any, BITs play in the investment 
decision-making process.191 
Second, empirical studies of the causes of the BIT phenomenon need 
to broaden their focus beyond the current and narrowly functionalist ex-
planation of the treaties as the inevitable consequence of a rational com-
petition for capital. What is missing from this standard account is any 
sustained comparative analysis of why the treaties, as one potential cred-
ible commitment device among several others, are better suited to per-
forming the task. The discussion above focused on several relatively 
formal ways in which host states might make such commitments, even 
absent a BIT. In particular, domestic laws and investment contracts 
might be used to make favorable substantive promises; to the extent that 
reputational concerns alone fail to make these promises credible, binding 
commitments to arbitrate disputes may be appended. Other mechanisms 
for coping with the problem of the obsolescing bargain, although not dis-
cussed in detail above, should not be forgotten. The widespread avail-
ability of home state investment insurance is especially significant, as is 
the availability of private ordering solutions in which the investor struc-
tures its relationship with the host state, perhaps by creating an “eco-
nomic hostage,” to make breach a less attractive option.192 
                                                                                                             
[t]he policies [embedded in NAFTA] were, however, policies that could have 
been undertaken anyway, if not under the NAFTA, then under the auspices of 
the GATT, or even in some cases unilaterally. In some ways, NAFTA was sim-
ply the culmination of a process of dramatic economic and social restructuring 
that had occurred, or was occurring, . . . in each country. 
Id. at 125. 
 191. For an example of the great potential that case studies offer in this regard and one 
of the first studies to systematically document the contours of developing state competi-
tion for FDI, see STEPHEN GUISINGER & ASSOCIATES, INVESTMENT INCENTIVES AND 
PERFORMANCE REQUIREMENTS 19–54 (1985). 
 192. See Oliver Williamson, Credible Commitments: Using Hostages to Support Ex-
change, 73 AMER. ECON. REV. 519, 519 (1983) (discussing use of economic hostages as 
credible threats whereby one party can take advantage of its position over another, usu-
ally by means of a system of incentives, to more efficiently enforce terms of the contract 
between the parties). 
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The real question, then, is what do BITs add to what was already avail-
able? BITs are hardly the inevitable solution to the insoluble problem of 
obsolescing bargain that they are often made out to be. In one of the 
more subtle and perceptive evaluations of the treaties, Wälde argues that: 
Before the advent of [modern BITs], the treaty drafters expected inves-
tors to be able to negotiate their own dispute settlement method by way 
of agreement with the host State. 
. . . [T]he treaties, in effect, added a direct investor right without rela-
tion to underlying dispute settlement arrangements in order to create an 
investor right that was independent of the ad hoc, individual negotia-
tion, licensing or other parts of the investment process. This was done 
under the assumption that investors should not have to rely on their 
own negotiating strength and ability but be able to rely on a general 
treaty-provided remedy . . . granted by law, not waivable and not de-
pendent on an individual jurisdiction agreement with the State. 
. . . 
. . . [The treaties] thus partly replace[] the need to negotiate in the con-
tract with the host State an internationalization regime consisting of 
stabilization, arbitration and an international law clause. 
Modern investment treaties have further developed this approach. They 
include methods of property and contract protection which individual 
investors, in an often more difficult negotiating context, might not have 
been able to negotiate on their own.193 
If Wälde is correct—and in my opinion, he is—what BITs bring to the 
table is far different from what BIT analysts typically assume. Take, for 
instance, Guzman’s claim that BITs are of great theoretical importance 
principally because they “allow potential investors to negotiate for what-
ever protections and safeguards they feel are needed.”194 What Guzman 
means, in other words, is that BITs work by supporting the enforceability 
of investment contracts, a claim repeated by Bubb and Rose-Ackerman, 
who, citing Guzman, argue that BITs have the potential to attract foreign 
investment by supporting enforceable contracts through the establish-
ment of a norm of pacta sunt servanda.195 This understanding of BITs is 
highly misleading. As we have already seen, host states have long had 
access to formal legal credible commitment devices that are, in theory, 
                                                                                                             
 193. Wälde, supra note 13, at 204–06 (emphasis added). 
 194. Elkins et al., supra note 7, at 644. 
 195. Ryan J. Bubb & Susan Rose-Ackerman, BITs and Bargains: Strategic Aspects of 
Bilateral and Multilateral Regulation of Foreign Investment, 27 INT’L REV. L. & ECON. 
291, 291–92 (2007). 
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potentially as effective as BITs. The BIT phenomenon has done little to 
directly enhance or promote the enforceability of contracts in particular 
because investors were allowed to negotiate with states well before BITs 
rose to prominence. While the enforceability of investment contracts has 
certainly improved over time, that improvement is due to other institu-
tional innovations (particularly the New York Convention and the ICSID 
Convention)196 that allowed investors to secure the fruits of those nego-
tiations with contract-based access to meaningful dispute settlement and 
award enforcement procedures.197 Indeed, one could make a presentable 
argument that BITs have undermined parties’ ability to contract, not 
helped it, by creating considerable confusion as to the proper doctrinal 
relationship between contract- and BIT-based claims.198 
More fundamentally, BITs may interfere with investor-state negotia-
tion by granting investors unwaivable protections and safeguards that 
they might or might not have been able to convince a host state to grant 
them in direct negotiations. This is the point that Wälde’s analysis brings 
to the forefront, and it is immensely important because it suggests that 
the main function of BITs is to limit host state bargaining power from the 
outset. The obsolescing bargain theory, which posits that host state pow-
er is at its weakest at the time of initial contracting and that the investor 
will usually have no trouble convincing the host state to promise it the 
world and more, is truly turned on its head because it is precisely at this 
point that there should be the least objective need for a treaty to specify 
the particular terms of the deal. If an investor cares enough about a par-
ticular promise, procedural or otherwise, the investor can bargain for it. 
BITs remove a good part of the bargaining space by forcing the host state 
to offer particular terms to all comers, even those who would invest 
without the treaty. 
Why then might host states enter into BITs? Three possibilities deserve 
further inquiry. 
BITs as Reducing Bargaining Costs. If we are wedded to narrow eco-
nomic-functionalist understandings of BITs, then it is worth considering 
whether their primary useful function might be to reduce bargaining 
costs rather than to permit credible commitment. Arguably, BITs elimi-
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nate the need for investors and host states to engage in costly direct bar-
gaining by providing the parties with default rules to govern their rela-
tionship, thereby eliminating the need to formally negotiate these rules 
on a project-by-project basis. 
Conceiving of BITs as default rules is attractive in large part because 
recently many host states have begun dismantling or scaling back their 
investment-approval institutions,199 thereby eliminating opportunities for 
investors and states to easily enter into direct privity. This understanding 
of BITs also raises a number of problems. First, the default rules pro-
vided by BITs are too vague for most important foreign investment pro-
jects, such as mining ventures or manufacturing facilities. In those cases, 
the foreign investor will almost always bargain with host state authorities 
and will be well-positioned to demand what BITs have to offer. Second, 
from a default-rules perspective, it is quite difficult to justify the ten-
dency of BITs to prevent host states and investors from bargaining 
around BIT rules. If BITs require host states to extend to investors offers 
that exceed the value of the investment to the host state, the host state 
will reject the investment. The surprising implication is that in some cas-
es BITs might actually be expected to discourage investment by prevent-
ing host states and investors from reaching a mutually acceptable bar-
gain. Third, if BITs are best viewed as reducing bargaining costs, and if 
bargaining costs in the absence of a BIT are slight compared to the over-
all value of the typical investment project, then the competitive advan-
tage that BITs can be expected to provide to developing states is corre-
spondingly slight, and BITs should not be associated with very signifi-
cant increases in investment flows. If this is indeed the case, we should 
be extremely suspicious of empirical studies that purport to find other-
wise. 
BITs as Ideas. A more convincing theory would emphasize the possi-
bility that host states have simply been sold a bad bill of goods.200 They 
have been advised and have accepted the idea that BITs are of decisive 
importance to many foreign investors and the costs of signing the treaties 
are low. For the vast majority of the history of BITs, there was no statis-
tical or case-study evidence of the effects of the treaties on FDI flows, 
and only recently have the costs of the treaties—meaning the extent to 
which a wide variety of host state policies might be successfully chal-
lenged before arbitral tribunals—become clear. For example, as noted 
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above, in 2004 Argentina faced international legal claims of approxi-
mately $16 billion.201 Argentina’s travails will likely make developing 
countries think long and hard about signing new BITs containing strong 
dispute settlement provisions.202 
An ideational theory of BITs suggests the quasi-formal mechanisms by 
which multilateral finance organizations, particularly the World Bank, 
advise developing countries on FDI policy are worthy of far more scru-
tiny than they have so far received.203 The World Bank is deeply in-
volved in investment arbitration (through ICSID) and in foreign invest-
ment insurance (through the Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency 
(“MIGA”)).204 It would not be surprising to find that World Bank advice 
to developing countries typically emphasizes the importance of signing 
BITs with pre-consents to ICSID arbitration and that developing coun-
tries that have sought World Bank advice on the subject are likely to fol-
low it.205 
BITs as Bribes. The third avenue of inquiry requires that we recognize 
that BITs are by definition interstate agreements, and that host states that 
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sign the treaties may in large part be attempting to please home state 
governments—and not necessarily home state investors—that are in a 
privileged position to control the flow of a wide range of benefits. Much 
neglected in existing functionalist accounts of the treaties are the ways in 
which capital exporting states have tended to make the availability of 
home state insurance contingent on a host state’s willingness to sign a 
BIT.206 The World Bank’s MIGA appears to have informally followed 
this lead. UNCTAD reports that MIGA “has also encouraged the adop-
tion of BITs as a test to ensure that investments are sufficiently pro-
tected” to merit the provision of insurance.207 This suggests the rather 
ironic possibility that host states may have signed certain BITs not be-
cause the treaties reduce the investor’s risk, but because signing the trea-
ties allows the investor to insure against the risk.208 The United States has 
also long made the availability of foreign aid contingent upon a willing-
ness to settle investment disputes by arbitration and in at least one case 
has used its influence in a multilateral development bank to block fund-
ing for a project because the host state (Costa Rica) was resisting an in-
vestor’s demand for arbitration in an unrelated dispute.209 Whether simi-
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lar pressures encourage states to sign BITs with the United States re-
mains less than fully explored, but the U.S. business lobby, in voicing its 
support for the U.S. BIT program, has explicitly urged the government to 
“consider the extent to which countries’ investment policies may have 
foreclosed development by private capital” before extending official aid 
or supporting loans from multilateral development institutions.210 
In closing, it is important to emphasize that empirical research on BITs 
is admirable and welcome. Empirically minded BIT analysts have laid a 
strong foundation on which future research can and should build, but 
future empirical work must be carefully designed to reflect important 
differences in the content of BITs and the availability of BIT substitutes. 
Until the concerns highlighted above are adequately addressed, credible 
commitment stories of the causes and consequences of BITs, and the sta-
tistical evidence that supports such stories, will remain much less persua-
sive than they otherwise might be.  
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